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FEATURE ARTICLE
TILA "Finance" and "Other" Charges in
Open-End Credit:
The Cost-of-Credit Principle Applied to
Charges for Optional Products or Services
By Ralph J. Rohner* and Thomas A. Durkin **
I. Introduction
Thirty-five years after the enactment of the federal Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA"),1 the determination of its core computational
and disclosure element, the "finance charge"-"the dollar amount the
credit will cost you" 2-remains challenging and elusive. In recent
years the question has arisen several times: how should the law
3
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Association, in comments to and discussions with the Federal Reserve Board and
its staff on the issues addressed in this article, but the views expressed here are not
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Senior Economist, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The
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authors alone.
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) §§ 101-171, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 (2004).
2 This descriptive statement must accompany the disclosure of the finance
charge amount in closed-end credit transactions. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.18(d). There is no comparable statement required for open-end credit.
3 The "law" refers to TILA as the statutory source, but also includes several
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characterize charges for products or services offered in connection
with a credit transaction or open-end credit plan where those products
or services are optional add-ons that the consumer may freely take or
reject? The black-letter text of the statute is inconclusive, perhaps
even Delphic.4 So is the principal interpretive source, the Federal
Reserve Board's ("FRB") Regulation Z.5  Scholarly literature
addressing "optional" charges as such is almost nonexistent.6 Other
interpretive guidance from the courts and from the FRB staff has
been sporadic and uncertain, lacking any consistent benchmark on
whether and when the cost of an optional product or service is a
finance charge.7 The uncertainty is compounded in open-end credit
where finance charge items imposed during a billing cycle must not
layers of regulatory amplification. TILA is implemented primarily through the
FRB's Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. part 226 (2004) [references hereafter to "Regulation
Z § _" are to the corresponding section in 12 C.F.R. part 226].
Regulation Z is further elaborated in the FRB Regulation Z Official Staff
Commentary, a compilation of FRB staff interpretations of the regulation which
appears separately in 12 C.F.R. part 226, Supplement 1 (2004) [references hereafter
to this Commentary will use the style "Commentary I " corresponding to the
numbered paragraphs in Supplement 1].
When changes to Regulation Z or the Commentary are proposed or promulgated,
the FRB publishes unofficial explanatory material about those changes in the
Federal Register. This regulatory history material is hereafter referred to as
"Supplementary Information," with references to pages in the Federal Register.
4 "[T]he amount of the finance charge [is] determined as the sum of all
charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended,
and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of
credit." TILA § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
' Regulation Z § 226.4.
6 See generally, RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING ch.
3 (2000); NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING ch. 3 (4th ed.
1999 & Supp. 2002); MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW chs.
6, 8 (2003). Nor is there explicit discussion of charges for optional products in the
leading early analysis of TILA finance charges. See Jonathan Landers, Determining
the Finance Charge Under the Truth in Lending Act, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 45
(1977).
7 See infra notes 115-21 (discussing the FRB staffs treatment of expedited
payment charges). Although the Board staff had informally opined that a creditor's
fee for arranging expedited payment on a credit card customer's account was a
finance charge, in this most recent instance of Commentary amendments they
formally proposed that it be treated as an "other charge." The final version of the
rulemaking found, instead, that it was neither a finance charge nor an "other
charge," and fell outside the TILA disclosure rules altogether.
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8only be disclosed as such, but must also be calculated into a
historical annual percentage rate ("APR") for that cycle, 9 and where a
separate category of consumer outlays that are not finance charges
must be disclosed as "other charges." 10 In all of this, the stakes are
high because mis-disclosure subjects the creditor to agency sanctions
and liability for actual and statutory damages, including aggregates of
those damages in class actions."
Activity in the marketplace suggests that the offering of
optional products and services is becoming a more common
technique for creditors to expand their customer services, compete for
market share, and increase revenues from their consumer credit
portfolios. These offerings are part of a larger trend toward the
"unbundling" of costs and fee structures.' 2 Some contemporary
examples include charges for: debt cancellation agreements, or "gap"
coverage;' 3 expedited delivery of credit cards; 14 arranging expedited
payments, routinely or to avoid a late charge; 15 assigning a mortgage
8 Regulation Z §§ 226.6(a), 226.7(f).
9 Id. at §§ 226.7(g), 226.14(c).
'o Id. at § 226.7(h).
11 Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2004).
12 Mitchell Pacelle, Growing Profit Source for Banks: Fees From Riskiest
Card Holders, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at Al. Many creditors, especially in
credit card plans, are aggressively imposing new and higher charges for consumers
who technically default (as by making late payments or exceeding a credit limit), or
whose overall risk profile increases (based on credit bureau data). Id. These kinds
of price adjustments have been criticized for imposing higher credit costs on poorer
consumers who are financially more risk-prone. Id.
13 After a rulemaking proceeding in 1995-96, certain of these charges are now
addressed explicitly in Regulation Z §§ 226.4(b)(10), 226.4(d)(3). They are finance
charges unless expressly disclosed as optional and separately authorized by the
consumer in the same manner as credit insurance. There have been recent press
reports about the popularity and profitability of variants of these debt cancellation
or debt suspension agreements, and a preliminary inquiry about them by the FRB.
See discussion infra notes 131-36.
14 In 2003, the FRB staff declared that these fees are neither finance charges
nor "other charges." Commentary 6(b)-2.ix, 6(b)-2.x.
15 The 2003 Commentary revision states that such a customer charge, incurred
occasionally to avoid late payment or cure a delinquency in an open-end credit plan
is neither a finance charge nor an other charge. Commentary 6(b)-2.x. But the
interpretation does not apply to "expedited" payment arrangements agreed to when
the plan is first established. 68 Fed. Reg. at 16,185, 16,186 (Apr. 3, 2003).
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in connection with a refinancing; 16 subordination agreements; 17 and
providing copies of transaction documents.1
8
Especially for open-end credit plans, one can envision an
additional array of optional services that a creditor might offer for a
fee which the customer might choose to acquire, such as: use of a
customer hotline; generating an annual compilation of credit
purchases; sending paper periodic statements, instead of "free"
electronic statements (or vice versa); providing new checks to draw
on a credit line; optional property insurance; or a "premium"
cardholder upgrade (with frequent-flyer or other travel perks). The
list of possibilities is as long as the marketing ingenuity of the credit
industry is fertile. There is some guidance on how to treat certain
examples of optional charges, but the process involves assessing each
charge on an ad hoc basis, either by the FRB staff or in the courts.
The generic question remains: whether these charges are
"imposed ... incident to the extension of credit."'
' 9
16 This type of charge was recently the subject of litigation in the federal
appellate court in New York. See Pechinski v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 345
F.3d 78, 80-82 (2d Cir. 2003). A consumer refinancing a mortgage loan asked the
original creditor to assign its mortgage to the refinancing creditor, thereby avoiding
certain state and local taxes. The original creditor charged an "assignment fee." The
court held that the fee was neither a finance charge nor a prepayment penalty: the
fee was not a finance charge because it was not "incident to" an extension of credit,
but rather to the extinguishment of a debt; it was not a prepayment penalty because
that relates only to forfeited amounts of finance charge.
17 For example, assume a consumer has a first (purchase-money) mortgage
and a secondary (subordinate) home-equity line of credit ("HELOC") outstanding
on his home. When the consumer refinances the first mortgage, the HELOC
creditor may charge a fee to accept and continue its subordinate priority position.
Although the fee may be "required" by both creditors, it is optional in the sense that
the consumer could theoretically pay off the HELOC creditor and remove the
subordination issue. Query: If this subordination fee is considered a finance charge,
for which creditor is it such-the lender refinancing the first mortgage loan (who
requires and benefits from the subordination), or the HELOC lender who actually
receives the fee?
18 Such fees charged to open-end account holders are apparently not finance
charges under the current Commentary. A fee for copies of transaction documents
is listed as an "other charge" (not a finance charge) if the request is submitted as a
billing error under Regulation Z § 226.13(a)(6). Commentary 6(b)-l.ii, 13(a)(6)-
1. But if a consumer requests transaction documents "for income tax purposes," the
fee that the creditor charges is excluded from the "other charge" category and so is
nothing for TILA purposes. Commentary 6(b)-2. There is no explicit mention of
document requests for other than tax purposes, such as for bookkeeping or account
reconciliation. This seems curious regulatory line-drawing!
'9 Regulation Z § 226.4(a).
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The thesis of this article is that a more workable approach to
characterizing fees for optional products and services is possible by
focusing on charges that represent payment for discrete products or
services of value to the consumer, freely chosen by consumers as
contract options which do not affect the amount of credit available to
the consumer, the consumer's access to it, or the allocation of
payment responsibility and credit risk in the transaction or plan. In
other words, these fees are for separate-or separable-purchases,
analogous to subsequent events in closed-end credit that require no
new disclosure or adjustment in the disclosed finance charge. 20 The
primary focus of this article is on open-end credit because it involves
greater interpretive and operational challenges.
This article first explains, in Part II, the critical role of
"finance charges" and "other charges" as costs imposed in credit
transactions and thus elements in the TILA disclosure scheme. Part
III provides a broad overview of the marketing and economic
considerations that influence how creditors price their products,
concluding that there is a long-accepted economic framework for
identifying the true costs of credit. The next section, Part IV, analyzes
the existing legal guidance on whether and when charges for optional
products or services are finance charges or "other charges" in the
TILA regime, suggesting that the current law lacks a consistent and
coherent principle. Parts V and VI then propose a set of extreme
alternative approaches, and several intermediate approaches on how
TILA might deal with optional charges, and analyze how those
approaches lack economic integrity. Finally, Part VII suggests a
different approach that builds on accepted economic premises and
characterizes charges as finance charges only when they compensate
the creditor for one of the four recognized components of the cost of
credit-origination, servicing, funding, and risk. Recognition of this
principle, the authors suggest, can be accomplished, without
amendments to TILA or Regulation Z, by amendments to the Official
Staff Commentary.
II. The Setting: The Role of "Finance Charge" and
"Other Charge" Characterizations in the TILA
Disclosure Scheme
Before analyzing the special problems posed by charges for
optional products and services, it is necessary to review briefly the
20 Id. § 226.17(e).
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role that finance charges-and "other charges"-play within the
TILA structure.
A. Finance Charge as an Essential Disclosure and Calculation
Component
1. Disclosure of Finance Charges as Dollar Amounts
For all consumer credit transactions, TILA requires creditors
to calculate and disclose the dollar amount of charges that are within
the regulatory definition of finance charge. 21 For closed-end credit,
the amount of the finance charge must be emphasized within the
"federal box" of segregated disclosures. 22 For open-end credit plans,
creditors must initially disclose the manner of determining finance
charges that may be imposed from time to time,23 and must also
disclose on the periodic statement the dollar amounts of those charges
imposed during the billing cycle.24 Thus, accurate identification of
charges as finance charges, or not, is critical to comply with
fundamental TLA disclosure requirements.
2. Identifying Finance Charge Amounts Necessary to
Determine the Disclosed APR
The finance charge not only represents the cost of the credit
as a dollar amount, but is an essential element in determining the
APR, which is the universal, comparative unit-cost descriptor for
consumer credit.
a. Closed-End Credit
For closed-end credit, the APR is derived from the payment
schedule. The APR represents the annualized simple interest rate at
which the scheduled payments amortize the amount financed over the
21 Regulation Z § 226.4.
22 Id. § 226.17(a)(1).
23 Id. § 226.6(a). Required disclosures made even earlier, in conjunction with
credit and charge card applications and solicitations, also must disclose information
about rates, fees, grace periods, and other cost components. Id. § 226.5a(b)(3).
24 Regulation Z § 226.7(f).
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fixed term of the transaction. 25 The role of the finance charge in this
calculation is critical but indirect, in the sense that any amount that is
a finance charge must be differentiated from the amount financed so
that the derived APR accounts properly for all finance charge
26
elements in the amortization.
b. Prospective Disclosure in Open-End Credit
In open-end credit plans, the initial disclosures must include
the nominal APR that results from the annualization of a periodic rate
applied to outstanding periodic balances 27 -the classic 18% annual
rate based on a monthly rate of 1.5% interest or service charges. 28
Specific fees that are finance charges-such as three dollars for a
credit card cash advance-must be included in the account-opening
disclosures, 29 and must also be disclosed as finance charges on the
periodic statement for the cycle in which the charge was imposed. 30 If
it is not possible to disclose finance charges in advance, such as the
finance charge that arises from application of a periodic rate to a
balance that is unknown when disclosures must be made, then the
method of calculation must be disclosed. 31 Though disclosed, finance
charges other than those arising from application of the periodic rate
do not factor into a prospective APR in open-end credit.
21 See id. § 226.22, and Regulation Z Appendix J. Mathematically the APR is
the periodic discount rate times the number of "unit periods" in a year that equates
the stream of payments to its present value, the amount financed.
26 For example, points or loan origination fees that are paid in cash or financed
as part of the loan must be deducted from the nominal loan principal to reach the
amount financed, the present value of the net credit extended. Regulation Z §
226.18(b) (defining amount financed). Indeed, all finance charges are excluded
from the amount financed. Commentary 18(b)(3)-1.
27 Regulation Z § 226.6(a)(2) (defining the corresponding annual percentage
rate).
21 Most open-end creditors now use daily, rather than monthly, periodic rates.
For an eighteen percent annual percentage rate, the daily periodic rate is
0.00049315 (0.18/365).
29 Regulation Z § 226.6(a)(4).
30 Id. § 226.7(f).
31 Id. § 226.6(a)(4).
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c. The Special Case of Historical APRs in Open-End
Credit
Since it is never known whether the consumer will incur a
specific finance charge fee in a subsequent cycle, it is impossible to
disclose prospectively a "blended" APR, i.e., one that combines the
periodic rate on unpaid balances with specific dollar amounts for
discrete activities (such as obtaining a cash advance). From the
origins of TILA, however, the law has required that open-end
creditors disclose a "historical" APR that totals all finance charges
imposed during a cycle, relates that sum to the outstanding balance
during that cycle, and annualizes the resulting rate. 32 For example,
assume a consumer has a $1,000 average balance in the period, which
accrues a fifteen-dollar finance charge by application of the periodic
monthly rate of 1.5%. Further assume that the consumer also incurs a
three-dollar cash-advance fee during that cycle. There is thus a total
of eighteen dollars in finance charges for that month, or an
annualized historical APR of 21.6%.33
This historical APR is accurate as far as it goes; consumers
may understand that the cash advance fee pushed the effective credit
cost upward last month, and so maybe they should be more cautious
about using the cash advance feature in the future. But it is a dubious
disclosure benefit at best. For one thing, the requirement that periodic
finance charges be translated into an APR based on the balance
outstanding in the same cycle in which the charge was incurred is
altogether artificial and unrealistic. It assumes the consumer repays
the cash advance, and the fee, within that same month, or at least
before the due date for the consumer's payment for that period. A
more accurate-real-APR would reflect the consumer's actual
repayment pattern over succeeding months, but of course it is
impossible for the creditor to know, at the time of sending the
periodic statement, what that pattern will be.
Second, the amount of the historical APR is purely fortuitous.
In the example above, if the consumer had obtained two cash
advances in the relevant period, the disclosed APR would become
25.2% .34 If the consumer had only a $100 balance (instead of $1,000),
32 Regulation Z §§ 226.14(c), 226.7(g) (containing the fonnula for calculating
the historical APR).
" (18/1000) x 12 = 21.6 percent.
34 The finance charge is now $15.00+$3.00+$3.00, or $21.00. Thus, (21/1000)
x 12 = 25.2%.
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the historical APR with one cash advance fee would be 54%; with
two cash advance fees, it would be an even more startling 90% APR!
Third, whether consumer behavior is influenced by the historical
APR disclosure has no empirical confirmation. The consumer's
decision to incur the cash advance fees was certainly not affected by
this disclosure that took place well after those transactions, possibly
by as much as a month. In short, the value of periodic aggregation
and disclosure of finance charge fees, and computation of them into
an historical APR, is considerably attenuated. But it is the law.
3. Post-Contract Changes in Terms
There is another way in which the characterization of a fee as
a finance charge affects the TILA disclosures: when the creditor
changes the terms of the account. In closed-end credit this is rarely an
issue, as the price terms of the transaction are generally fixed at the
outset and rarely change thereafter, and in any case, disclosure is only
required once, at the point of consummation of the transaction. 35 If a
closed-end creditor were to impose a new charge at a later time,36 no
new disclosure would be required on account of that "subsequent
event"-unless the "subsequent event" is a refinancing, which is a
new extension of credit requiring new disclosures. 37 But for open-end
credit, a creditor's ability to change terms to reflect risk or increase
revenue is a linchpin of the open-end product line. Virtually all open-
end plans include provisions allowing the creditor to change terms at
will; the consumer is deemed to have accepted the new terms by
continuing to use the credit line. As a matter of contract law, courts
have recognized that open-end credit is essentially a continuing offer
which the creditor may modify or withdraw. 38 Usually, by state law 39
35 Regulation Z § 226.17(b).
36 A possible example could be a requirement for private mortgage insurance
if the value of the mortgaged property declined below a certain debt to value ratio.
37 Regulation Z § 226.17(c).
38 See Garber v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (I11. App.
Ct. 1982) (discussing a classic holding on this point); see also Mandel v.
Household Bank (Nevada), 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 383-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(providing a more recent example of a holding on this point). In other recent
litigation, some creditors have been exposed to liability for violations of TILA and
state consumer fraud laws for marketing credit cards with apparently fixed price
terms, such as "no annual fee," but then changing those terms within a short time.
Rossman v. Fleet Bank, 280 F.3d 384, 400 (3d Cir. 2002); Roberts v. Fleet Bank,
342 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2003).
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and widespread industry practice, a consumer who objects to the
changed term may pay off the account balance on its original terms
but cannot make new draws on the credit line.
TILA generally requires specific advance disclosure to
consumers of changes in the terms of open-end plans.4 ° This applies
to any of the types of charges that must be disclosed when the
account is solicited or opened, and therefore includes any finance
charge elements. A credit card issuer who wants to- increase the
periodic rate, for example, or increase the amount of cash advance
fees-both clearly involving changes in the amounts of finance
charge imposed-must send written notice of the change to all
affected card holders at least fifteen days before the effective date of
the change. This means that a creditor faces a significant logistical
chore in preparing and mailing change-in-terms notices in proper
form, either along with periodic statements or by separate mailing, to
its entire portfolio of card holders, or at least all of them subject to
the changed term. Whether or not a particular newly imposed charge
is a finance charge therefore affects the creditor's disclosure
responsibilities regarding changes in terms, and the timing of the
effective date of the changed term.
B. Relationship of Finance Charges to "Other Charges" in Open-
End Credit
Even if charges for optional products or services are not
finance charges, they may have to be disclosed as "other charges" in
open-end credit plans. Since their enactment in 1968, TILA and
Regulation Z have required that open-end creditors describe in the
initial disclosures "other charges which may be imposed as part of
the plan.",41 Regulation Z also requires that each periodic statement
itemize the amounts and types of "other charges" imposed during the
39 See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.205 (1974) (typifying state
laws requiring notice before changes in terms).
40 Regulation Z § 226.9(c)(1). Subsection (2) of the same section excuses
creditors from having to send change-in-terms notices in several circumstances:
where the change involves late or over-limit charges, documentary evidence fees,
suspension or termination of the account, or changes resulting from judicial
proceedings or the consumer's default. Id. § 226.9(c)(2). Interestingly, these
exceptions include any reduction of any component of a finance charge or other
charge; no advance information about good-news changes, only bad.
41 Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(5) (2004);
Regulation Z § 226.6(b).
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period.42 Thus, if one option is to treat charges for optional products
or services as finance charges, another option is to treat them as
"other charges." Because closed-end credit has no comparable "other
charge" category, the discussion here is applicable only to open-end
plans.
Legislative and regulatory history gives little guidance as to
what constitute "other charges." They are obviously not finance
charges.43 By general comparison to the rules for closed-end credit,
"other charges" could include various late, delinquency, or default
charges.44 Or, read literally, they could include any conceivable
charge that might ever be levied under the plan, regardless of amount
or contingency.
The FRB Staff Commentary refers to "other charges" as
"significant charges related to the plan," 4 5 suggesting that fees which
are not significant in amount (or recurrence?), or fees not related to
the plan, are not "other charges." "Significant" compared to what?
Does "related to the plan" mean that "other charges" must be part of
the contractual plan, or may they be extrinsic to it?
The Commentary lists seven examples of "other charges. 46
42 Regulation Z § 226.7(h).
43 Id. The line between finance charges and other charges can itself be the
subject of dispute-all the way to the Supreme Court. In Pfennig v. Household
Credit Serv., Inc., 295 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals accepted
plaintiff's argument that certain over-limit charges meet the literal definition of
finance charge even though the Commentary to Regulation Z puts them in the
"other charge" category. Commentary 6(b)-l.i. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the FRB Commentary characterization was not unreasonable and
therefore controlled. Household Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pfennig, 124 S. Ct. 1741,
1749-50 (2004).
44 For closed-end credit, the only specific "charges" (other than finance
charges) that must be disclosed are late payment and security interest charges.
Regulation Z § 226.18 (1), (o).
41 Commentary 6(b)-l.
46 Id. The seven examples of "other charges" are:
1. Late payment and over-the-credit-limit charges;
2. Fees for providing documentary evidence of transactions [requested
under the provision on Billing Error Resolution];
3. Charges imposed in connection with real estate transactions such as
title, appraisal and credit report fees;
4. A tax imposed on the credit transaction by a state or other
governmental body;
20051
Loyola Consumer Law Review
With the possible exception, of example (2)-fees for providing
documentary evidence of transactions-each of these examples
assumes the charge is required to establish, maintain in good
standing, or terminate the credit plan. None of these examples
describe charges for truly optional products or services. There is little
guidance from this eclectic list on whether various unmentioned
charges for optional customer services should be considered "other
charges."
If a charge for optional services or products is not a finance
charge but is an "other charge," the charge must be included in the
initial disclosure when the account is opened, and must be reflected
on the periodic statement for any cycle in which the charge is levied.
Also, like a finance charge, the introduction of a new "other charge,"
or a change to an existing one, requires an advance change-in-terms
notice in most cases. For creditors wishing to offer, for a fee, optional
customer services that may be only infrequently used, the change-in-
terms notice requirement may be a real hang up. It would require that
creditors send notices to perhaps thousands or millions of customers
to flag a possible fee that few of them would ever incur. Periodic
adjustments to a roster of incidental service fees could burden the
periodic statement process, and prevent creditors from usin7 the extra
envelope space for other products or marketing promotions.
C. The Wild-Card Category: "Not 'Other Charges."
If the choices for characterizing charges for optional customer
products or services were limited to "finance charge" or "other
charge," the differences would be modest. As discussed, both sets of
charges must be disclosed to consumers when opening an account
and on periodic statements. If a creditor changes any of these
charges, or introduces new ones, the creditor would usually need to
5. A membership or participation fee for a package of services that
includes an open-end credit feature, unless the fee is required whether
or not the open-end feature is included;
6. [Certain] automated teller machine (ATM) charges;
7. Charges imposed for the termination of the open-end credit plan.
Id.
47 Even without TILA requirements, creditors wishing to change contract
terms for existing card holders presumably would need to communicate the
changes to effect contractual agreements with those customers. TILA adds explicit
format and timing requirements and the threat of liability for misdisclosure.
Regulation Z § 226.9(c); TILA § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2004).
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give change-in-terms notices. The only significant difference is that
"other charges" would not be factored into the historical APR.
On the other hand, if optional customer service fees are
neither finance charges nor "other charges," they apparently drop off
the TILA radar screen, and consumers have no legal right to any
particular form of disclosure about them. Is this possible?
It is indeed possible that certain customer charges related to a
credit account or plan disappear completely from the TILA
landscape. In closed-end credit, this appears partly by inference-the
required TILA disclosures do not address a number of post-
consummation events or services that may trigger customer fees, such
as default and foreclosure charges, or charges for deferrals or
extensions-and partly by cross-reference, i.e., the TILA closed-end
disclosures must refer the consumer to the credit contract for further
information. For open-end credit, the Commentary carves out a
subset of examples of charges that are "exclusions" from the "other
charge" category. 48 In other words they are "not 'other charges,'
and require no disclosure at all. This is a curious catalog of examples.
Several refer to charges that already must be disclosed under other
parts of Regulation Z.4 9 One item deals with default-related charges
48 Commentary 6(b)-2 provides:
The following are examples of charges that are not "other charges":
i. Fees charged for documentary evidence of transactions for
income tax purposes;
ii. Amounts payable by a consumer for collection activity after
default; attorney's fees... ; foreclosure costs; post-judgment
interest rates . . . ; and reinstatement or reissuance fees;
iii. Premiums for voluntary credit life or disability insurance, or
for property insurance, that are not part of the finance charge;
iv. Application fees... ;
v. A monthly service charge for a checking account with
overdraft protection that is applied to all checking accounts,
whether or not a credit feature is attached;
vi. Charges for submitting a check that is later returned unpaid;
vii. Charges imposed on a cardholder by an institution other than
the card issuer for the use of the other institution's ATM ...
viii. Taxes and filing or notary fees... ;
ix. A fee to expedite delivery of a credit card...;
A fee charged for arranging a single [expedited] payment on the
credit account ....
Id.
49 E.g., taxes, filing or notary fees are on the "not 'other charges'" list, but
those charges are excluded from the finance charge only if "itemized and
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that TILA has generally left to the parties' contract.50 Another item-
application fees-relates to charges required of unsuccessful as well
as successful applicants, and so is disconnected from the credit
eventually granted. Another-ATM fees-refers to third-party
charges. Yet another---checking account service charges-rests on
the premise that the charge is not a function of an extension of credit.
Until 2003, only one item on the list-fees for documentary evidence
for tax purposes-appeared to cover an optional service to the
consumer. The two newest additions, items (ix) and (x), added in
2003, also recognize that certain "optional" customer service charges
fall altogether outside the TILA disclosure rules. It is hard to see a
principled common denominator to this "not 'other charges"'
category, except perhaps expediency; it probably represents an ad hoc
process of regulatory accretion over time, answering one
interpretational question at a time. Note also that the list is by way of
examples, suggesting that there may be other fees or charges-
perhaps not yet invented-that also fit this third category.
In reality, the debate over the proper treatment of fees for
optional products or services is between "finance" and "other"
charges on the one hand, either of which characterization entails
substantial disclosure responsibilities, and "not 'other charges"' on
the other hand, which carry no TILA responsibilities at all. As the
credit industry unbundles, and proliferates, its pricing components
and charges for various products, it is attractive to the industry to
keep as many components as possible off the TILA chessboard.
Consumerists and other observers, in turn, worry that the
fragmentation of pricing components into non-finance charge
categories threatens the basic integrity of the TILA disclosure policy
and its approach to "the cost of credit." It is disclosure of the cost of
credit, after all, that underlies TILA in the first place.
III. Marketing, Economic and Policy Considerations
Aside from all the legalisms-and before returning to them in
the next section-it is helpful to consider the competitive
marketplace in which the legal issues arise. Consumer credit,
disclosed." Regulation Z § 226.4(e). Likewise, premiums for credit or property
insurance are "not 'other charges,"' but these also require specific disclosures to be
excluded from the finance charge. Id. at § 226.4(d).
50 Informally, the Federal Reserve staff had indicated that a "reissuance fee"
under item (ii) could include a fee for issuing a new card to replace one that was
lost or stolen. That kind of reissuance now seems explicitly covered by new item
(ix).
[Vol. 17:2
TILA "Finance" and "Other" Charges
especially open-end credit, is a popular product marketed by banks
and other institutions intensely concerned about market share and
profitability. 51 What are the influences that drive pricing strategies
and produce the array of fees and charges that are the focus of this
article?
A. Economic Influences; Maintaining Creditor Revenue Streams
1. Product Complexity
Much of the complexity of the legal concept of the finance
charge arises because of two interrelated difficulties: (1) the necessity
of trying to separate into components, and even subcomponents,
transactions that by their nature are parts of a whole and not easily
separable; and (2) the requirement for specific lengthy and detailed
disclosures about the secondary components of the credit part, i.e. the
amount financed, finance charges, and "other charges," with
substantial penalties for mistakes. It is a brew destined for
controversy at the least, with the potential to be frustrating and costly
for those responsible for complying.
First, concerning separating transactions into components, it
is worth remembering that consumers do not purchase credit services
as ends in themselves, as they might do with football tickets or new
suits of clothes. Rather, credit is normally a single part of a larger
undertaking: it involves changing the pattern of payments for
5' According to FRB Statistical Release G.19 for July 8, 2004, consumer
credit outstanding at the end of May, 2004 totaled $2.031 trillion of which $742
billion was revolving (open-end) credit, most of it credit-card credit, and $1.280
trillion was non revolving credit. Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19,
Consumer Credit (July 8, 2004) at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G19/20040708/. In recent decades the
volume of consumer credit outstanding relative to consumer sector disposable
personal income (income after taxes, or "DPI") has fluctuated cyclically in a
relatively narrow range and has not risen much overall. Within consumer credit
outstanding, however, revolving credit has risen since the late 1960s relative to
DPI, and non revolving credit has trended downward relative to DPI over the same
period. These trends suggest that the technological changes that have permitted
widespread production of revolving credit over this period, together with increasing
popularity of its features among consumers, have led to a substitution of revolving
for non revolving credit. See Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer
Attitudes 1970-2000, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, Chart 1, at 624-25 (Sept. 2000)
(illustrating the trends in consumer credit).
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consumer purchases into a preferred timing scheme.52 Thus, by its
nature, credit use most often is only the time payment component of a
purchase totality that also involves acquisition of something else.
Residences, vehicles, other durable household goods, sizeable
recreation items, college educations, vacations, holiday gifts, and
even restaurant meals are examples of substantial purchases often
directly associated with time payment--credit use.
53
Second, besides a direct relation to specific goods or services
purchased on credit, the totality of many credit events often includes
the purchase of additional ancillary financial services such as
insurance and even deposit accounts. Some kinds of insurance are
very closely related to the credit product, for example, private
mortgage insurance, which is insurance against default on the
mortgage. Other kinds of insurance that might be purchased
simultaneously are less closely related directly to the credit, such as
homeowners' property insurance or automobile liability insurance.
Such purchases often occur along with and as part of the totality of an
event generating credit use, whether the underlying transaction
involves direct purchase of goods and services or only a simple loan
of money. Correctly differentiating the costs of the credit component
from the rest of the transaction can be tricky enough in cases like
insurance to require assumptions and rules of thumb. Even then, all
the regulatory assumptions, rules of thumb, and compliance decisions
made under them must pass muster under legislative and court-
induced disclosure standards that themselves are not static.
Third, business firms, as profit-oriented enterprises, are
naturally going to try to sell additional products and services
whenever theaY sense an opportunity to do so at a price sufficiently
above cost. Any business firm selling goods or services to
consumers is going to think about what else it can sell at the same
52 The basic theory of finance as dependent upon the timing of cash flows is
found in any textbook in the field. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 4th ed., 15-23 (1991).
53 In 1970, a survey of consumers, undertaken for the National Commission on
Consumer Finance, found that few consumers considered the credit component to
be a more complicated part of the purchase decision process for consumer durable
goods than the choices associated with the durables themselves. To the best of our
knowledge a similar survey has not been undertaken since then. See GEORGE S.
DAY & WILLIAM K. BRANDT, A STUDY OF CONSUMER CREDIT DECISIONS,
TECHNICAL STUDIES OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FIN., Vol. 1,
No. 3, 42 (1973).
54 See generally JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (1942) (providing a classic discussion of entrepreneurial motivation).
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time, even those selling time payments (credit) rather than other
goods and services. This is hardly surprising behavior. The fact that a
creditor also sells something else does not automatically make the
other sale credit, however, or turn the cost of the other component
automatically into a finance charge.
Fourth, even though it may be difficult to isolate the credit
portion of a transaction in a way that makes credit disclosures easy,
creditors will typically have to do even more than that. With modem
technology and a competitive marketplace, creditors can no longer
rely on cross subsidies among broad classes of credit products or
groups of customers to guarantee overall institutional profitability.
Such an approach would simplify disclosures to be sure, but
marketplace conditions will no longer permit it. Rather, creditors are
going to have to consider the price of a variety of product
components and customer groups separately to avoid losing the
customers who are eligible for the best deals. If this complicates the
process of allocating the parts of the credit products into proper
buckets for required disclosures, it is something they will need to live
with. This development deserves a bit more discussion because it is
part of the reason why financial transactions sometimes seem so
complicated today.
2. Product Complexity and Disclosures
Congress rightly understood in 1968 that credit use typically
was part of a larger transaction involving time payment for some
purchases. It also understood that information available to consumers
at that time about the pricing of credit was confusing to the point of
being chaotic. Banks typically quoted rates on an annual discount
basis but collected payments in monthly installments. Rate ceilings
for banks under state laws were often stated in annual discount-rate
form, but calculating finance charges this way resulted in an effective
yield about twice the stated rate. Retail store creditors, a much more
important group of consumer creditors in 1968 than today, typically
quoted rates on an add-on basis consistent with their own rate
ceilings found in state retail installment sales acts. 5 Effective yields
55 For discussion of rates and rate quotation before TILA, see generally
ROBERT W. JOHNSON, METHODS OF STATING CONSUMER FINANCE CHARGES
(1961); BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION
(1965); WALLACE P. MORS, CONSUMER CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES (1965);
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE 169-71 (1972). After discussing conditions that existed before passage of
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due to add-on rates were also about twice the rate employed in the
calculation, but add-on rates are mathematically distinct from
discount rates and behave quite differently as maturities lengthen,
even for a given nominal rate. Consequently, add-on rates are not
comparable to discount rates although they look similar superficially.
Finance companies quoted either add-on rates or percent per month,
depending on the nature of the underlying transaction and how it was
regulated. Again this meant that their charges were not easily
comparable with those of other institutions using different calculation
methods. Credit unions also generally quoted percent per month, but
in a form not readily comparable with the other institutions, including
the finance companies who also quoted percent per month but whose
state regulations often involved stepped rates with multiple levels.
In this environment, Congress passed the TILA in 1968 to•56
improve disclosure of credit costs. Although TILA, as amended
over the years, contains some provisions regulating practices of
creditors, mostly in the area of rescission rights on loans secured by
residences, credit card solicitations, credit card billing, home equity
lines of credit, and high-cost mortgages, the law always was and still
remains primarily a disclosure statute. Furthermore, there is no doubt
that Congress intended to require disclosure of credit costs, as
complicated or as bound up with other things as that may be. This
intent is revealed in many places in the hearing record and
discussions of the time but probably no more clearly than in the
introductory remarks of Senator William Proxmire, the chief sponsor
of the bill that ultimately became TILA:
Truth in Lending, the National Commission on Consumer Finance in its 1972
Report made the following observation:
As a result of these varying forms of quoting the rate of charge,
consumers could often compare rates among lenders in one class, such
as commercial banks, but seldom between classes of lenders, such as
credit unions and commercial banks. Inter-industry rate comparisons
would have been possible only if all segments of the industry used the
same basis for disclosing finance rates, whether dollar add on, dollar
discount, percent per month, or annual percent. But because different
segments of the consumer credit industry were wedded to various
methods of calculating and disclosing rates by historic precedent and,
in many cases by state laws, comparison shopping for credit across
industry lines was almost impossible. This lack of comparable rate
disclosure helped create a climate favorable for legislation requiring
uniform quoting of rates of charge.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra, at 170.
56 Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-66 (2004)).
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The first principle of the bill is to insure that the American
consumer is given the whole truth about the price he is
asked to pay for credit. The bill would aim at full disclosure
of the cost of credit so that the consumer can make
intelligent choices in the marketplace.
The second principle is that the whole truth about the cost
of credit really is not meaningfully available unless it is
stated in terms that consumers in our society can
understand. Without easy knowledge of this unit price for
credit, it is virtually impossible for the ordinary person to
shop for the best credit buy.
A third principle is that the definition of finance charge,
upon which an annual percentage rate is calculated, needs
to be comprehensive and uniform. It needs to be uniform to
permit a meaningful comparison between alternative
sources of credit. The definition of finance charge also
needs to be comprehensive in order to convey the true cost
of credit. 57
After Congress passed TILA, industry disclosure practices
changed sharply and information about credit pricing became much
more available and comparable, but disclosure legislation did not
alter the increasing pace of change in financial markets that occurred
in the following decades. There is much greater variety and
complexity in the credit group of products available to consumers
today than there was among their antecedents of thirty or forty years
ago, yet it was familiarity with those relatively primitive products
that produced TILA. Even the classic model of closed-end credit has
evolved from a one shot transaction paid off in due course, to a
variety of fixed-term, but adjustable, credit arrangements. Consumers
may now purchase goods on credit, or lease them for a limited term.58
Sometimes the credit obligation may include a balloon, or a surrender
option that resembles a lease but really is not. Interest rates on
51 Introductory Remarks to Accompany S.5, CONG. REC. S1202 (Jan., 1967).
The original sponsor of Truth in Lending was Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois,
who was defeated for re-election in November, 1966. During the series of hearings
on credit disclosures in the early 1960s, the proposed Truth in Lending Bill was
typically referred to as the "Douglas Bill."
58 As a practical matter, consumer leasing amounts to using credit but with an
assumed residual value greater than zero at the end of the lease period.
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everything from home mortgages to credit cards may be adjustable
periodically to track an agreed index. There are wide differences in
interest rates quoted to different consumers on the basis of risk.
Reverse mortgages allow senior citizens to draw down the
accumulated equity in their homes. Beyond all the contractual
variations is the fact that closed-end credit obligations are frequently
refinanced by consumers to take advantage of economic conditions or
to address their own cash flow situations. Variations in types of
replenishing open-end plans are even more dramatic.
3. Pricing Requirements
A requirement for disclosure of credit costs immediately begs
the question: what are the costs that must be disclosed? As with any
other goods or services, credit costs for consumers are the prices paid
for the characteristics of credit use, i.e. deferred payment. Also, as
with any other product or service, it is the specific characteristics of
credit use that separate it from other things, for example,
distinguishing credit use from other financial services like deposits or
insurance. To see this point more clearly, it seems useful to recognize
distinctions among products (or services) groups, different
products/services groups, and differentiated products/services within
groups.
In this context, a product or services group involves offerings
with the same fundamental characteristics. An automobile, for
example, has four wheels, a passenger compartment, and an engine of
some sort that enables it to move independently of other vehicles. In
contrast, a bicycle has two wheels and no means of self-locomotion,
so it does not have the same characteristics as an automobile. In
between, a motorcycle has some characteristics of each but is not the
duplicate of either, and so it belongs to a third product group. Thus,
although distinctions are not always perfectly clear, the basic idea is
clear enough: products or services with the same basic characteristics
belong to the same product/services group while offerings with
different characteristics belong to different product/services groups.59
Automobiles and television sets, for example, are very different
products because they have very different characteristics, while
automobiles and motorcycles are more closely related; nonetheless,
they still are different products because they have different sets of
59 See KELVIN LANCASTER, VARIETY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY 1-35 (1979)
(providing a fuller, but accessible discussion of these points by the founder of
characteristics theory in economics).
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characteristics. Similarly, in the services area, haircuts are different
services from college educations because they have different
characteristics. Likewise, college educations are different from high
school educations because their characteristics are different-or at
least they should be.
Taking this distinction a step farther and looking in between
different and the same products, differentiated products, or services
are those that have the same characteristics but in different amounts.
The education experience among colleges is differentiated by
different amounts of academic rigor, party atmosphere, quality of
facilities, nearness to a prospective student's home, and so forth.
Likewise, as will be discussed further below, different sorts of credit,
such as credit card accounts versus mortgage loans, all are part of the
same product group because they have the same basic characteristics
involving sorts of deferred payments. Nonetheless, they are not
identical products because they have different amounts of the
characteristics that constitute types of payment deferrals. In other
words, they are differentiated products in this terminology. Because
they have different amounts of vital credit characteristics, it should
not be especially surprising that they typically sell for different
prices.
60
Economists recognize four fundamental components or basic
characteristics of the deferred payment, or credit, service that
creditors provide to consumers: credit origination, servicing, funding
or forbearance, and risk bearing. Credit types can be quite different-
closed-end or open-end, fixed or variable rate, secured or unsecured,
large (home mortgage) or small (payday loan)-but these are
"differentiations" among credit products that reflect differing mixes
of product characteristics-and resulting prices. Yet at base, all of
these transactions share a core of common characteristics that
60 Lancaster noted that the distinction between different and differentiated
products is not always as easy or exact as one could wish:
The distinction between differentiated products and different products
can become somewhat shadowy. The term "product differentiation" is
used here to mean variations in the characteristics contents of goods
within the same closely defined group. In common terminology,
product differentiates correspond to different "models" of automobiles
or radios, whereas an automobile and a radio are products from
different groups. The term "brand," used widely in marketing literature,
is not properly synonymous with product differentiate, since there may
be several models (and thus product differentiates) under a given brand
name or identical products under different brand names.
Id. at 26.
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distinguish extensions of credit from other products or financial
services. Economically, the finance charge is the cost of providing
these elements of deferred payment. Differences in these areas are
what cause differentiation among credit types and, therefore,
differences in the pricing of credit accounts.
Origination refers to all the cost-causing operating activities
that are involved in booking the credit in the first place. 6' These
activities may include evaluating and checking credit, any necessary
interviewing of prospective customers, and establishing any needed
documents and records. They also include marketing, printing forms,
and any need for legal counsel in establishing a credit operation and
booking credits, including compliance considerations.
For the different kinds of credit, origination costs for any
particular kind of credit contract through a particular marketing
channel, say credit cards through prescreened solicitations or
automobile credit through a dealer network, are much the same for
every customer. This means that costs are more closely related to the
number of accounts than to the size of individual accounts. A
doubling, for example, of the credit amount may call for some greater
credit checking and other cost-causing actions, but not likely a
doubling of the origination cost; this is a condition referred to as
"scale economies" with respect to credit size. Since there are scale
economies with respect to account size, origination costs per credit
dollar decline as the amount of the credit increases. This explains
why small loans are much more costly and carry higher APRs than
larger loans: the necessary APR to cover the origination cost is much
higher per credit dollar for smaller loans.62 Costs can vary across
marketing approaches, however, for example in-person loan
interviewing versus over the Internet or present customers versus new
ones.
Servicing refers to routine billing, receiving payments from
consumers, handling inquiries and complaints, and managing the
record keeping and accounting functions. For consumer credit,
servicing normally involves the most unexciting part of the generally
unexciting part of those operations usually known as the "back
61 See THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE,
supra note 51, at 143-47 (discussing origination and servicing costs associated with
consumer credit); see also Dagobert L. Brito & Peter R. Hartley, Consumer
Rationality and Credit Cards, 103 J. POL. ECON. 400 (1995) (specifically
discussing credit cards).
62 See THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE
supra note 51, at 143-47.
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office." Servicing typically involves computer capabilities, auditing
and controls, communications, and other ongoing aspects of the
operating systems. Clearly, the pricing of consumer credit contracts
must include coverage of the servicing aspects of the company, but,
assuming the term "servicing" does not include cost of risk, servicing
cost would tend not to vary much from one consumer's account to the
next, at least for the same sorts of accounts serviced the same way.
Under these conditions, periodic servicing activities and costs usually
would not vary much by account, other things equal, although the
total would be higher on accounts of longer maturity.
Servicing costs, however, can differ sharply between types of
credit. Notably, there is a significant servicing distinction between
typical closed-end credit and credit cards. After account origination,
management of card accounts involves the need for instant record
keeping for account and fraud control. Most importantly for general
purpose cards like Discover, MasterCard and Visa, servicing requires
instant communications capability to millions of merchant locations
simultaneously, worldwide. This necessitates a much different cost
structure from typical closed-end consumer credit, which, for the
most part, can function without instant communications and records
management. General-purpose card systems also require servicing the
extensive networks of merchant locations, a side of the card business
known as the "merchant" side or the "acquirer" side. It also requires
establishing and maintaining networks of contractual relationships
with millions of merchants in addition to millions of consumers. All
of this is very expensive and quickly differentiates the cost structure
of credit-card credit from other sorts of consumer credit.63 Servicing
costs also can vary by amount of labor effort involved, highly
automated versus paper-based, for example.
Funding or forbearance involves the costs of the funds used in
providing the credit to consumers, including the profit needed to
assure continuous access to capital funds. 64 The need for funding
gives rise to an immense industry that channels funds from savers
who have resources available for use to borrowers who have current
63 See generally DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH
PLASTIC (1999) (offering an interesting and readable account of the nature of
modem credit card operating systems and the nature of the contractual agreements
necessary to make them work).
64 See generally EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERK, CAPITAL AND INTEREST, A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF ECONOMICAL THEORY (William A. Smart, trans. Macmillan
Co. 1890) (1884); see also IRVING FISHER, THE RATE OF INTEREST: ITS NATURE,
DETERMINATION, AND RELATION TO ECONOMIC PHENOMENA (1907).
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financial needs greater than currently available liquid capacity.65
Typical consumer savings transactions take place through financial
intermediaries like banks, savings and loans, credit unions, insurance
companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and others that receive
consumers' savings. These institutions then channel the resources
back to the same or other consumers through retail credit
establishments including banks, savings and loans, credit unions,
finance companies, and sellers of goods and services. The channeling
process is complex and sometimes even hard to understand,
especially when it involves such modern borrowing devices among
institutions as asset-backed securities, 10 and PO strips, and other
sorts of derivative instruments. But, the funding process has also
become very efficient, with the ability to redirect immense amounts
of resources as needed from ultimate lenders to ultimate borrowers.
Without going into the complexities, it should be sufficient to note
that the forbearance aspect of consumer credit is not the most
significant cause of cost differences among kinds of credit for
consumers. Again, leaving aside for a moment the issue of risk, there
is no particular reason why an additional dollar of credit would be
more expensive to a given consumer than the previous dollar on the
basis of funding cost alone. In other words, there are no scale
economies or diseconomies with respect to account size in
forbearance on consumer credit.
The final fundamental service provided by creditors is risk
bearing. It may be of more than one kind, for example credit default
or "credit risk" versus market conditions or "interest-rate risk.",
66
65 Consumer credit provides an important outlet for employing financial
resources available from net surplus components of the economy, notably from
consumers themselves. In fact, if not in common perception, the consumer sector of
the economy taken as a whole actually has always been a net lender in financial
markets, not a net borrower. As revealed in the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds
accounting system, net financial investment by the economy's consumer sector
(either directly or through intermediaries like banks and pension funds) passed the
$1 trillion mark as long ago as 1958 (net of $183 billion of household liabilities at
that time) and has continued to rise steadily ever since. Net consumer-sector
financial investments totaled more than $24 trillion in current dollars at the end of
2003, when consumers' financial assets approximated $34 trillion and total
liabilities were a bit under $10 trillion. Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1,
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States (Mar. 4, 2004), at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z 1/20040304/. Even so, households
obviously continue to borrow large amounts of funds, typically through financial
intermediaries, sometimes from the same ones where they hold their reserves.
66 See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921)
(discussing the general theory of credit risk versus interest-rate risk); Dwight M.
[Vol. 17:2
TILA "Finance" and "Other" Charges
Default risk varies sharply by type of customer, but interest rate risk
depends on overall conditions in national and even international
financial markets and how the maturities and durations of
institutions' entire portfolios of assets and liabilities are structured.
This makes default risk the more important variable component of
pricing on a typical, individual consumer credit transaction.
It is well known and obvious that consumers vary
significantly on the basis of the likelihood that they will be able and
willing to repay any given deferral of payment (credit). Clearly, the
likelihood depends upon the amount of the credit, the security or
collateral offered, the consumer's current and expected available
resources-assets and income-and some undefined underlying
psychological factors that determine both frugality and willingness to
meet obligations. These differences lead to the art and science of
credit evaluation or screening as an attempt to differentiate among
good and bad credit risks. Without delving into how this is done,
there is no question that it is central to consumer credit markets or
that there has been technological change over time in how it is done.
It has become evident to most observers that improvements in
screening capabilities due to technology, such as credit scoring and
automated credit bureaus, have recently permitted greater
differentiation among risk groupings of consumers than in the past.
Differentiations along each of these fundamental features of
credit arrangements-origination, servicing, funding, and risk
bearing-produce a huge variety of consumer credit arrangements,
each with its own distinct combination of individual characteristics.
There are large loans and small loans, secured loans and unsecured
loans, prime loans and sub prime alternatives, open-end and closed-
end credit, and many variations of each. Whereas once it might have
been difficult for creditors to produce such a multiplicity of products,
today the capability readily exists. This means someone seeking a
market niche is going to try to produce credit products with virtually
any kind of combination of features that can be supplied profitably.
In the resulting environment where variety is available, consumers
are going to look for tailoring of product offerings. Otherwise, they
will let someone else become their supplier. Since the combinations
of the characteristics of the wide variety of resulting products vary
directly along the dimensions associated with underlying cost
differences, it should not be surprising that there is differentiation of
Jaffee & Franco Modigliani, A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing, 59 AMERICAN
EcONoMic REVIEW (1969) (providing a general analysis of credit risk and the loan
offer function).
2005]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
pricing in the marketplace according to these characteristics. Most
importantly, the price of credit is going to vary most according to the
origination cost per dollar of credit advanced and because of the cost
of risk. There also is going to be a sharp difference, other things
equal, in costs of account servicing between closed-end and open-end
credit.
4. Pricing Complexity
All this discussion of differentiation and complexity in the
marketplace leads inevitably to the question whether it is really
necessary at the consumer level. In a competitive marketplace with
ongoing technological change the equally inevitable answer is going
to be "yes." Economic theory projects this outcome, but it is quite
intuitive for a simple reason: in a competitive marketplace with many
available options, consumers are not going to be willing to pay for
components they do not use, and they are going to have to pay for the
components they do use, whether characterized as finance charges,
"other charges," or something else under the legacy disclosure
framework known as "truth in lending." Consumers are willing to
pay for options when purchasing houses, cars, computers, sports
equipment, college educations, and virtually everything else with
multiple characteristics; why should credit be any different? Also,
they generally are unwilling to pay for options they do not want or
expect to use. Why should credit be any different on that dimension
either?
As indicated, the economic reason for expanded numbers of
available combinations of characteristics of credit arrangements is
that they arise from the unwillingness of consumers to pay for the
cross subsidies inevitable when separable characteristics of a
transaction are priced jointly. The difficulty for creditors who might
prefer otherwise is that trying to retain a system of such cross
subsidies in a competitive marketplace increases the risk of losing the
profitable customers to others offering a better deal. This happens all
the time for all sorts of products, but it leads inevitably to additional
complexity when the components of a smorgasbord are priced
separately. Let us look at this more closely.
It obviously is not strictly necessary for producers or sellers to
earn a profit on every separate component of a product with multiple
characteristics or from every customer when there are multiple
customers. The necessity is only that the totality of the enterprise's
activities be profitable. It is also clear that some aspects of
products-or even some complete products-can sometimes be
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treated as loss leaders, or they can even become completely lost in
the pricing shuffle, never considered to be possibly profitable by
themselves. It usually is not necessary, for example, for there to be a
specific price and profit associated with the acreage devoted to the
parking lot for a typical financial firm. It often is possible to prosper
while making "free parking" available to customers, and many firms
do it. As long as the gain in net sales from providing the lot exceeds
the cost due to it, the firm will devote resources to parking, and the
small subsidy associated with free parking does not seriously
complicate transactions.
But, failing to price important components of a transaction
separately can lead to its own brand of complications. Significantly, it
does not follow from the notion that products have multiple
components, or from the idea that not all components need be priced
separately all the time, that business firms can ignore how they price
components of products and transactions. With competition, they
cannot turn whole classes of separable components or products into
loss leaders for other components or products through cross subsidies
among their offerings. If firms held monopoly positions in the
marketplace, they might be able to engage in substantial cross
subsidies, but generally they do not have this luxury. Rather, almost
all consumer-oriented sellers must face some sort of competition, and
it always comes in the area where they are overpricing components or
products.
One feature of a competitive marketplace is that it rarely
permits sellers to mix the pricing of products through cross subsidies.
There are many historical examples where profitability was based
upon cross subsidizing loss leaders, but with development of
competition, the opportunity quickly disappeared. It is easy enough to
see why: cross subsidies encourage new competitors to enter the
marketplace and compete but only on the profitable side of the cross
subsidy. Left to themselves, market entrants simply refuse to compete
on the other side, that is, in the component or product area where
sales are made at a loss. Railroads in the nineteenth century and
telecommunications in the twentieth century offer some very well
known examples, but there are many others that are equally
illustrative.
67
67 In the nineteenth century, the railroads, in effect, owned the transportation
industry. See generally MERTON J. PECK, Transportation in American History, in
AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY (Seymour E. Harris ed., 1961). There were
competing rail systems to be sure, but they generally did not all go to the same
places and there was little enough of competition between many end points and
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Consumer credit and credit cards offer a twenty-first century
example of the need to price for the services offered. In an earlier era
when differential interest rate ceilings for different institutions tended
to limit competition between institutional classes, such as between
banks and finance companies, at a time when geography also
generally limited competition among individual institutions, and
when the primitive nature of credit underwriting and management
systems meant it was difficult to differentiate carefully among
consumers, creditors could, and usually did, charge all customers the
especially on many low traffic branches. The only other real competition was from
slow horse-drawn wagons or watercraft, where there were adequate roads or canals
or navigable rivers and no ice to interfere. In this environment the rail companies
tended to overprice on carrying products with high value relative to their bulk (like
high-value manufactured goods and passengers) and on moving all commodities on
branch lines where there was little or no competition. They then tended to
underprice the transportation of bulk commodities on main lines, charging only
enough to cover operating costs and overhead. This tended to build volume and
revenues to cover costs for the system overall, but they earned their profits mostly
from the high value goods and the monopoly branches.
What happened to the railroads is, of course, well known. In the twentieth century
they faced new forms of competition, but precisely only on the overpriced services.
Trucks, air freight, and the passenger automobile (all arising from technological
change) competed away the transportation products where the railroads were
overcharging, leaving the railroads with only the main line bulk commodities.
Trucks and air freight never even attempted to seize traffic in coal and grain, of
course, for the obvious reason that they could not possibly charge a price to
undercut the rails in these areas. Many bankruptcies later, a few remaining railroads
resurrected themselves in the later twentieth century as rapid, bulk-commodity
haulers, but transportation will never again be like it was.
More recently, the same sort of thing happened in the telecommunications industry.
For almost a century the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and its Bell
System operating companies maintained almost a monopoly on domestic telephone
service. To encourage widespread connection to the system, the Bell System tended
to underprice local telephone service relatively, and it generated much of its
profitability in the long distance service. When telecommunications opened to
greater competition, the new competitors naturally gravitated toward competing
only in the relatively overpriced long distance service and AT&T ceased to be the
financial powerhouse it had been for so many decades. Technological change,
evolving regulatory policies, and many other factors were important in making the
telecommunications revolution of the past few decades, but there can be little
question that the industry has changed and the end of cross subsidies was important
in generating this change. Today the long distance market is highly competitive and
(inflation adjusted) prices at the consumer level are much lower than they used to
be. In contrast, local telephone service prices (now free of cross subsidy) are higher
than they used to be. The important lesson for purposes here is that as competition
has increased dramatically, the opportunities for cross subsidies simply have
largely disappeared.
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same price (interest rate) for the credit service offered. Individual
applicants to a particular financial institution were either acceptable
under the creditor's underwriting criteria or they were not. If an
individual were accepted as a customer, he or she typically paid the
same interest rate as every other accepted customer for the same
amount of credit extended.
No longer is this approach to business possible in an era when
technological change has made differential processing possible by
making it significantly easier to screen risks into more gradations and
to acquire and communicate easily with customers from afar. In this
environment, increased competitiveness in the consumer credit
marketplace has made it difficult to cross subsidize one group of
consumers by charging some other group of customers too much. The
attempt merely causes an influx of competition, but only in the area
of the overcharge. No one is going to rush into a market to seize only
the loss leaders.
Instead, they are going to compete in the part of the market
where there is overpricing. Unlike many years ago when creditors
charged everyone the same amount, today technology permits much
finer gradations in the characteristics of the credit services offered.
The most important changes have involved improvements in ability
to make gradations of risk, but there are other changes as well. In the
risk management area, credit scoring, computerized record keeping,
automated credit bureaus, and rapid communications permit creditors
to charge different risk groups more carefully on the basis of the risk-
related characteristics they exhibit.
Most consumers realize there have been improvements in the
ability to judge risk, especially those who benefit from the new
regime. Lower risk consumers are bombarded by offers such as
prescreened credit card solicitations and offers of refinanced home
mortgages and home equity loans at low rates until they are largely
unwilling to pay more than a minimum. Millions of consumers will
rapidly refinance their home mortgages when interest rates drop, even
if they drop only a handful of basis points. Lower risk consumers also
know they can easily change credit card accounts or open new ones.
68
Simply put, any creditor who attempts to charge large numbers of
consumers more for credit than their risk status requires will lose
business. It would be nicely profitable to charge low risk customers
68 Durkin, supra note 51, at 629 (showing that approximately eighty-five
percent of holders of bank-type credit cards believed it would be easy for them to
obtain another card if not treated well by their card issuer, according to a 2000
consumer survey).
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high prices for credit, but there is no indication this is any longer a
very easy thing to do.
69
5. Pricing by Characteristics
If creditors are not routinely able to engage in extensive cross
subsidies among credit products, among the components of
individual products, or between credit products and other offerings,
then how are they going to base their pricing? The answer that should
be becoming clear by now is that in a competitive marketplace they
are going to have to price individual products, whether credit or not,
on the basis of the characteristics of those products. 70 As developed
here, this means that the price for credit will be based upon the
characteristics associated with origination, servicing needs, funding,
and risk. Loss leaders and cross subsidies in limited areas or for low
cost or infrequently found characteristics of products are still
possible, but opportunities along these lines are going to be limited. If
creditors offer other products that are not credit, including associated
products and services or others less closely related, but products or
services that not all customers will want to purchase as part of or
associated with their own credit arrangements, they generally will
have to price them separately as well. Then they also will have to
ensure that the totality of the arrangements passes muster under
prevailing disclosure requirements, for consumer credit notably truth
in lending.
What are some examples of the sorts of difficulties that arise
for making disclosures? An obvious one is that credit must be
differentiated from other products and services. Truth-in-lending
requires disclosures of the pricing 6f credit, but it is necessary to
separate credit properly from other products and services in order to
disclose properly the pricing of the credit aspect of the entirety of the
transaction. In some cases this is not going to be easy or the
69 Pacelle, supra note 12, at Al ("Gone are the days when banks collected
hefty annual fees on all credit cards and charged fat interest rates to all consumers.
Now, the banks say, they must rely on risk-based pricing models under which
customers with the shakiest finances pay higher rates and more fees."). For a
broader view of competition among card issuers, see Todd J. Zywicki, The
Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79 (2000) (discrediting the theory that
the credit card industry is fundamentally noncompetitive).
70 See TIMOTHY P. RoTH, THE PRESENT STATE OF CONSUMER THEORY (2d ed.
1989) (providing a readable discussion of the development of this theory). See also
H. A. JOHN GREEN, CONSUMER THEORY (1976) (giving a more advanced
discussion of the theory).
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separating lines crystal clear. Before discussing how this might be
done for open-end credit plans, it seems worthwhile to look at some
of the features of modern open-end credit arrangements that illustrate
the difficulties involved.
B. Characteristics of Modern Credit Card Plans
1. Range of Offerings
Open-end credit plans, which will be the focus here, typically
have even more components than closed-end credit, to the extent that
one can say a typical credit card plan is less a financial transaction
and more a living financial relationship, in which a credit extension is
embedded but which contains many other ingredients. Consider the
possible features of a typical bank credit card arrangement. The
cardholder has a credit line which can be drawn upon anywhere in the
world-the credit cornerstone of the relationship. But the cardholder
can also use the card as a transaction device, a cash substitute, by
paying off balances without revolving, although this arrangement is
still credit in the sense that purchase and payment are still separated
by a short time. The card also serves other non-credit functions for
the customer, such as identification and affinity-group participation.
The cardholder may also use, and value, other aspects of the card
relationship, such as a variety of insurance products, credit or other
life or health coverages, casualty or replacement insurance for goods
purchased, frequent flyer miles, travel club privileges, merchandise
credits, and the list goes on. Consumers with home equity credit lines
underneath their credit card realize tax deductions for interest paid.
Even within the credit feature itself, customers may opt for an
upgraded plan, skip-payment privileges, annual expense summaries,
linkage to a deposit account, automated clearing house ("ACH")
payments, overdraft privileges, and so on. Unlike closed-end credit,
open-end plans contemplate periodic statements, usually monthly,
that are not only collection mechanisms but ready-made marketing
platforms.
For the card issuer, the card plan relationship is also a broad
marketing opportunity for products not directly related to credit
services. It starts with the credit line as a discrete financial product,
but includes the marketing of countless other products and services
through statement stuffers, special mailings, and telemarketing. 71 By
7' The FTC/FCC Telemarketing Registry ("Do-Not-Call") rules do not apply
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virtue of the information-sharing provisions in the Fair Credit
72Reporting Act, a card issuer can routinely share customer
information among its corporate family and with third-parties,
generating continuing circles of marketing opportunities. Increasingly
the bank card relationship becomes the platform to market investment
products. Periodic account monitoring through credit reports allows
the card issuer to increase credit lines, send convenience checks, and
otherwise influence the card holder's use of the plan.
A card issuer's roster of financial and related services may
resemble a Wal-Mart of product offerings and customer choices.
Some items are high mark-up, some less so; as mentioned, other
features may even sometimes be loss leaders.7 3 Some products clearly
constitute or implicate an extension of credit (the basic credit line),
others are only marginally related to the existence and maintenance
of the credit line (fraud loss insurance), and still others seem clearly
distinct and separate from the credit plan (mutual funds promoted to
card holders through statement stuffers or telemarketing).
Across this storehouse of credit card offerings and features,
and related products and services, the card issuer can modulate its
revenue stream in a variety of ways, and may be largely indifferent as
to the precise source of the revenue so long as portfolio targets are
met. Even considering that the card issuer's basic product is the credit
line, and the basic pricing mechanism is the applicable interest rate or
APR, this explicit rate is only one of a range of pricing variables the
creditor may employ. To change the APR revenue stream, the card
issuer can, of course, adjust the explicit periodic rates and APRs. It
can also: (1) add or increase an annual or membership fee; (2) adjust
merchant discounts and interchange fees;74 (3) adjust the balance
assessment methods applied to determine the periodic balance subject
to finance charge; 75 (4) reduce or eliminate grace periods; (5) shrink
where there is an "established business relationship" with the consumer. See FTC
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii) (2004); FCC
Restrictions on Telemarketing and Telephone Solicitation, 47 C.F.R. §§
64.1200(c)(2), 64.1200(f)(9)(ii) (2004).
72 Fair Credit Reporting Act § 624, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-3(4)(c) (2004),
amended by Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
159, § 214(2), 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
73 Initially discounted or teaser rates, for example.
74 The latter would require cooperative or directive action by the credit card
network as a whole.
75 Commentary 5a(g)-l, 5a(g)-2 (describing various balance assessment
methods).
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the payment period;7 6 or (6) add or increase fees for actual or nominal
delinquencies.77
To this list we can add another category: (7) offer separate
products or services to customers on an optional basis, rather than as
contractually mandatory terms of the credit. Revenue flows from this
category will be as substantial as the creditor can induce or persuade
customers to opt for the add-on item. The recent FRB rulemakings on
expedited 7payment or expedited delivery of a card are current
examples.7 A cardholder may be willing to pay an extra fee to have a
payment processed quickly and electronically, to avoid a late charge
or simply as a matter of convenience. A cardholder may agree to pay
a fee to have a replacement card delivered by overnight courier. Each
such ancillary service can carry a price, and in the aggregate these
services may generate substantial income separate from the basic
interest rate and related fees applicable to the credit plan. The
question is their position within the TILA structure.
The phenomenon of card issuers offering and charging fees
for ancillary products and services is part of the trend toward
"unbundling" the creditor's pricing structure discussed above, both to
increase revenue and to distribute costs more explicitly to those
consumers who cause them. If the card issuer did not, or could not,
charge a separate fee for expedited payment or expedited card
delivery, the card issuer might absorb the cost of providing those
76 If the periodic statement were sent promptly on the close of a billing period,
the customer would theoretically have almost a month to make the required
payment before the end of the new billing period. But the law only requires that the
statement be mailed at least fourteen days before the payment due date. Regulation
Z § 226.5(b)(2)(ii). Allowing for several days in the mail at each end, this means
the customer may have barely a week to mail in the payment to avoid a late charge.
This shrinking payment period can boost revenue by getting payments in hand
earlier and by generating more late payment fee income.
77 See Pacelle, supra note 12 at Al (including such fees as those for late
payments, accounts over the limit fees, bounced checks and non-revolving
balances).
78 This list contemplates open-end offerings by banks in the form of credit
cards, home equity lines, and the like. If the creditor is itself a retail merchant, it
can manipulate revenues in another variety of ways through the pricing of its goods
or services independently from the credit line that finances their purchase. Most
major retailers now offer their credit cards through a bank affiliate, at least in part
to take advantage of rate-exporting privileges available to federally insured
depositories. But the synergy between the retailing and financing arms remains
real.
79 See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
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services in its general overhead and reflect that new cost in an
increased periodic rate. But this increased rate would be paid by all
customers and not just by those who opt for the service. In lieu of this
kind of cross subsidization, the card issuer could choose not to offer
the services at all, at the risk of customer dissatisfaction and
competitive disadvantage. More likely, the provider is going to want
to price its products and services in a way that adds to its business
volume rather than drives its customers away. This means charging
only those who purchase extra goods or services the price of those
additional goods and services. If these goods and services are not
credit, then their prices are not finance charges.
2. The Finance Charge: What is the Cost of Credit?
What, then, constitutes a finance charge under TILA? In
particular, how does the economic concept of the finance charge as
the cost of credit relate to the finance charge as a legal concept within
TILA? As discussed, the economic concept of the finance charge is
the cost of deferring payment for resources received now in the form
of goods and services (sales of things on credit) or cash (cash loans).
The cost of deferred payment arrangements arises from expenses due
to origination, servicing, funding, and risk. Consequently, payment
for these characteristics of a transaction totality that includes deferred
payments is the economic conception of the finance charge as the
cost of credit, and so it follows that payments for them should
constitute the finance charge under TLA; other payments even if
associated with credit arrangements are costs and payments of
something else. As indicated, separating the totality of transactions
into their components is not always so simple, however. When
Congress decided that the costs of the credit component of the totality
would henceforth be disclosed to consumers in specified formats, this
decision led to many of the complications and legal decisions that
have been the history of TILA.
For credit cards most of the costs of the credit arrangements
have been within the scope of the disclosed finance charge since the
earliest days of TILA in 1968. Much of the cost of origination,
servicing, funding, and risk is assessed to consumers through
application of a periodic percentage to a balance outstanding, or
through assessment of transaction charges required under some plans.
Some other sources of revenue have never been considered finance
charges, however, for both conceptual and practical reasons.
Interchange fees or discounts assessed to merchants whenever the
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card is used are not finance charges, for example. 80 They are not
directly assessed on consumers; they are more properly considered
part of the operating costs of the merchants. As such, they more
properly become part of the cost of the goods sold on credit cards.
They are similar to the merchant costs associated with accepting cash
and checks in exchange for goods and services, including accounting,
reconciliation, fraud prevention and control, and physical security.
Within this guideline, the fees noted by Regulation Z as
"other charges," or neither finance charges nor "other charges,"
would appear to be correctly classified in an economic sense. They
are not fees assessed for normal expenses of origination, servicing,
funding, or risk. Arguably, late payment, over-limit, and default fees
are associated with riskiness of accounts, but they arise from events
subsequent to initiation of the account relationship when initial
disclosures are provided. In that sense they are like charges that are
subsequent events on closed-end credit that do not require re-
disclosure. It seems such charges are increasingly prevalent today
because of the needs of card companies to retain their best customers
by not cross subsidizing those who cause higher costs by paying late
or otherwise defaulting. Late paying and otherwise riskier customers
also typically pay higher percentage rates today. But, card companies
simply are no longer able to charge all customers the same
percentage rate and cover the higher costs due to the late payers from
general revenues available from percentage rates charged to balances.
The lower risk customers would simply gravitate toward card issuers
maintaining only a prime portfolio and charging those better
customers lower rates. Regardless of whether such charges seem
correctly classified, there has been considerable controversy over
these classifications since 1968, and it continues today. Before
returning to discussion of general principles that might be applied to
defining finance charges, it seems worthwhile to review further
development and current status of the law in this area.
It seems inevitable that creditors will consider the legal
disclosure consequences of whatever combination of pricing
strategies they want to deploy. If the costs of incidental or ancillary
products and services, offered to customers on an optional basis, must
be treated as "finance charges" or as "other charges," creditors may
see the compliance burden and liability risks as disincentives to
offering those products or services. This is especially true if the
charges must be treated as finance charges - they must be factored
into disclosed APRs, including the historical APR in open-end
80 Commentary 4(a)-2.
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credit.81 At some level at least, this would force creditors to compete
on the basis of that derived, unit-cost-of-credit percentage rate,
whether they want to or not. All of this highlights the importance of
the question here: What is a TILA finance charge or what should it be
other than a response to some disclosure requirement or some sort of
compliance convenience?
IV. The State of the Law: Optional Fees as Finance
Charges, Or Not?
This section seeks to sort out, from regulatory rulings and
case law, what is the prevailing interpretation on the issue whether
charges for optional products or services are finance charges or
something else.
A. What is a Finance Charge? The Definitional Structure
1. The Basic Definition
To assess whether any charge, including particularly a charge
for an optional product or service, is a TILA finance charge, the
starting point is the statutory and regulatory language. According to
Regulation Z:
The finance charge is the cost of consumer credit as a
dollar amount. It includes any charge payable directly or
indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of
the extension of credit. It does not include any2 charge of a
type payable in a comparable cash transaction. 2
The general approach, therefore, is all-inclusive. Any charge
"imposed ... as an incident to or a condition of' the credit is a
finance charge. 83 The regulation goes on to enumerate ten types of
charges that are finance charges; these are examples rather than an
all-inclusive list.84 Then, the regulation explicitly carves out a
8' See supra Part II.
82 Regulation Z § 226.4(a).
83 id.
84 Id. § 226.4(b) is captioned "Examples of finance charges," cf, Commentary
I Introduction-4(a).
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number of charges that are not to be treated as finance charges.
85
These represent various compromises or adjustments to what might
be a purist approach to economic characterization; most of these
compromises or adjustments have been in TILA since its birth,
-although several are more recent additions. A complete parsing out of
the finance charge definition is a lengthy and complex undertaking.
86
Suffice it to say that most of the debate, litigation, and
interpretational gloss on the TILA finance charge definition has to do
with whether a charge clearly required by the creditor as a condition
of the credit fits into one or another of the specific categories of
inclusion or exclusion.
2. The Credit Insurance Model
Although there is nothing in Regulation Z or the Commentary
that addresses charges for optional products or services as a generic
category, there is one example of such a charge that has been treated
explicitly in the Act and regulation since 1968: premiums for credit
insurance. Credit insurance pays off all or a portion of a credit
obligation if the consumer dies, becomes ill or disabled, loses
employment, or has some other impediment to payment. 87 It therefore
represents a value-added for the consumer-his family or survivors
are excused from responsibility for the debt. At the same time, the
creditor's collection risk is reduced by virtue of the insurance, and the
creditor may also realize substantial income from sales of credit
insurance, through commissions, experience rebates and the like.
Historically, lawmakers have been concerned about the "reverse
competition" dynamic in the marketing of credit insurance-creditors
are inclined to offer more expensive, rather than cheaper,
coverages-and are also inclined to hard-sell the credit insurance
despite its ostensibly voluntary character. 88 Still, the content of the
85 Regulation Z § 226.4(c).
86 See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 6, ch. 3; see also National Consumer
Law Center, supra note 6, at ch. 3.
87 "Credit insurance," as the term is commonly used, is different from private
mortgage insurance or other forms of insurance against credit loss, which pay the
creditor when the consumer defaults, regardless of the reason for the default. Credit
loss insurance premiums are always a finance charge. Regulation Z § 226.4(b)(5).
Economically they are payment for the creditor's risk bearing. Credit insurance is
more limited in scope in that it frees the consumer, or the consumer's estate, from
risk due to a limited number of specified contingencies.
18 Litigation over the voluntariness of credit insurance may have peaked in US
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product is regulated to a degree by the state insurance commission.
The rule for credit insurance reflects these concerns. Credit insurance
premiums are prima facie finance charges whenever "written in
connection with a credit transaction."W But the premiums are
excluded from the finance charge if (1) the insurance is not required
by the creditor, is voluntary on the consumer's part, and the creditor
discloses that fact; (2) the creditor discloses the initial term of
coverage and the amount of the premium; and (3) the consumer, in
writing, separately authorizes the purchase.
90
Here is one model for dealing with charges for optional
products or services-presumptively include their cost in the finance
charge when they represent underlying characteristics of the credit
transaction itself, but carve them out where there are safeguards to
assure that the consumer's purchase is truly voluntary. 9' But because
this model rests in the statutory text, and applies by its terms only to
credit insurance, it cannot easily be transposed to other voluntarily
incurred products or services.92
Life Credit Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 599 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g
denied, 604 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1979), and Anthony v. Cmty. Loan & Inv. Corp.,
559 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1977). These cases suggest that, although voluntariness
remains a factual question, a consumer is usually bound by the purchase
authorization he or she signed. See Commentary I 4(d)-5. More recently, the
packing of credit insurance into high-priced mortgages, particularly where the lump
sum insurance premium for a limited term is financed over the fife of the mortgage,
has been cited as part of the "predatory lending" problem. U.S. Departments of
Housing and Urban Development and Treasury, Curbing Predatory Home
Mortgage Lending: A Joint Report (June 2000), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/report3076.htm.
89 Regulation Z § 226.4(b)(7).
9 Id.
91 The TILA treatment of property insurance, i.e., casualty coverage on
property, is roughly similar, in the sense that the creditor may require such
coverage, but to exclude the premium from the finance charge the creditor must
disclose that the consumer can obtain the coverage elsewhere, and must disclose
the price and term if the insurance is furnished by the creditor. Regulation Z §
226.4(d)(2). The regulatory provision does not literally say that it is limited to
insurance on property serving as collateral for the loan, but that is its obvious
context. What, then, if a creditor offers optional casualty coverage, or "replacement
protection," for goods purchased on an unsecured credit card line? Must the
creditor still jump through the disclosure hoops just noted, or may the creditor treat
this optional purchase as completely outside the finance charge definition? An old
staff letter said yes. FRB Letter No. 378, CCH Cons. Credit Guide 30,559 (July
29, 1970). There is no more current view, certainly not a contrary one.
92 Sometimes creditors offer life or health insurance coverages that are not
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B. Interpretational Guidance: 1968-2004
1. Early Board Staff Opinions
Other than the credit insurance model just discussed, for
almost thirty years after TILA's enactment, there were only
fragmentary signals from the FRB or the courts9 3 on the proper
treatment of charges for optional products or services. Absent explicit
guidance, some creditors and their attorneys took a certain comfort
level from the basic statutory and regulatory language defining
finance charges as "imposed" by the creditor. Under this view, unless
the purchase of the product or service was mandatory, a required
condition to the extension of credit, the charge did not represent a94
cost of the credit, and was not a finance charge. The weight to give
this general sentiment is debatable; it may have been no more than
keeping one's interpretational fingers crossed. The credit insurance
model, discussed above, at least technically rejects this view.
Prior to the "simplification" of TILA in 1980, and the
complete re-writing of Regulation Z and introduction of a staff
"Commentary" in lieu of interpretational letters, there were a number
of FRB staff letters suggesting that certain fees were not finance
charges if the product or service purchased with the fee was an
optional add-on to the credit contract. The apparent rationale is that a
voluntarily assumed charge for an ancillary product is not incident to
"credit insurance" because neither the creditor nor the consumer's account are the
loss beneficiary on the policy; the benefits may be fully payable to the consumer or
to the consumer's survivors, for example. Commentary & 4(d)-6 recognizes that
"[i]f such insurance is not required by the creditor as an incident to or condition of
credit," it is not a finance charge. In this carve-out, the Commentary in fact is
recognizing the principle that associated sales of products unrelated to credit
origination, servicing, funding, or risk, are not costs of credit. Commentary I 4(d)-
6.
93 One of the few cases is Veale v. Citibank, F.S.B., 85 F.3d 577 (11th Cir.
1996), where the court held that a courier fee (for disbursing loan proceeds) was
optional and therefore not "incident to" the credit extension. Id. This holding may
now be affected by the 1996 statutory and regulatory revisions that address third-
party closing agent charges. Under current Regulation Z § 226.4(a)(2), the courier
charge is a finance charge if the creditor requires either the service or the charge, or
shares the fee with the third-party.
94 The authors do not have a scientific sampling of this creditor rationalization
but can recall numerous conversations with creditors or their lawyers who took it as
gospel that charges for truly optional products or services could not be finance
charges.
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or a condition of the credit. Examples include:
1. A two dollar monthly charge for a package of banking
services (free checking, safe deposit box, etc.) that included
a credit card account-not a finance charge
95
2. A fee for "voluntary purchase" of a copy of an
amortization schedule-not a finance charge
96
3. A fee for copies of sales slips the customer wants for
bookkeeping purposes-not a finance charge
97
4. A voluntarily incurred fee for storage of a fur coat
serving as loan collateral-not a finance charge
98
While these old letters are officially "superseded" by the new
Regulation Z and the Commentary,99 they do suggest that the FRB
staff recognized some limits to an all-inclusive approach to the
finance charge definition. Since the core of that definition has not
changed since 1968, these staff views retain some relevance. None of
these early letters appear to articulate the view that charges the
consumer voluntarily incurs are "imposed" within the finance charge
definition, or even that optionally incurred fees are presumptively
finance charges.
During the 1970s, the FRB staff also developed the notion
that charges payable in a comparable cash transaction, whether
optional or required, were not finance char es because they were not
distinctly related to the credit extension. 10 ( Sales taxes and tag-and-
title fees were the leading examples. This "comparable cash
transaction" limitation is codified in the revised statute,' 10 appears
also in Regulation Z, and is the subject of extensive elaboration in the
95 FRB Staff Letter 715, CCH Cons. Credit Guide 31,014 (Aug. 24, 1973).
96 FRB Staff Letter 643, CCH Cons. Credit Guide 30,904 (Nov. 2, 1972).
97 FRB Staff Letter 1035, CCH Cons. Credit Guide [ 31,375 (Apr. 22, 1976).
98 FRB Staff Letter 773, CCH Cons. Credit Guide 31,095 (Apr. 4, 1974).
99 Commentary I Introduction-3.
100 See e.g. FRB Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0018, 41 Fed. Reg.
51391, CCH Cons. Credit Guide 131,486 (1976).
1o1 Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 106(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2004).
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Commentary. 0 2 One of the examples given is a charge for a service
policy or auto club membership, implicitly incident to the sale and
financing of an automobile.' 0 3 Such add-on purchases are typically
offered on a voluntary basis, and the Board staff might have excepted
them from the finance charge on that basis, in parallel with the earlier
staff letters. Including them in the "comparable cash transaction"
exception, however, makes sense to cover even required add-on
purchases of this type, such as sales taxes. 104
On reflection, the comparable cash transaction criterion for
excluding charges from the finance charge may be nothing more than
a euphemism for saying that the charge is really not for the credit at
all, but reflects a separate purchase only temporally connected to the
extension of credit. Tag-and-title fees, or sales taxes, may be
unavoidable-required-for anyone purchasing a new car, but that
expense satisfies the motor vehicle department or the tax collector
and has no bearing on the terms of the credit buyer's loan obligation.
In any case, it is difficult to invoke the comparable cash transaction
reference point in evaluating a post-account opening charge in an
open-end credit plan, such as for expedited payment or expedited
delivery of a card; there simply is no cash transaction to which to
compare it.
From 1980 until 1995 the issue lay largely dormant. The
Commentary, from its inception in 1981, recognized two instances of
a "voluntary" charge that was not a finance charge-for documentary
evidence, such as sales slips,10 5 and for non-credit insurance
premiums °6-but that was it from the FRB and its staff. Moreover,
there is virtually no reported case law dealing with charges for
optional products or services in the entire period from 1968 through
the mid-1990s. But in late 1995, the FRB "went public" with its
views on charges for optional products or services.
102 Commentary I 4(a)- 1.
103 Commentary 4(a)-l-i-D.
104 But note that "[c]harges for a required maintenance or service contract
imposed only in a credit transaction" would be finance charges. Commentary
4(a)-l.ii.C.
105 Id. 6(b)-2.
" Id. 4(d)-6.
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2. The Post-1995 Interpretational Morass
a. Round 1: Debt Cancellation Agreements
In December 1995 the FRB proposed new Commentary 0 7 to
deal with "debt cancellation agreements," described as follows:
In the case of motor vehicle loans, debt cancellation
agreements [DCAs] (sometimes referred to as "gap"
agreements) offer protection to consumers in the event the
vehicle is stolen or destroyed and the motor vehicle
insurance proceeds are insufficient to extinguish the debt.
Under these agreements, in return for a fee paid, the
consumer is not held liable for the remaining balance on the
loan. Other types of agreements may provide for debt
cancellation if the borrower dies or becomes disabled. In
some states, debt cancellation agreements may be regulated
as or otherwise considered insurance contracts.
10 8
The proposed Commentary built on the insurance
characterization. If the DCA were treated as insurance under state
law, the fee could be excluded from the finance charge under the
existing regulatory provision dealing with credit insurance. But, the
proposal suggested, if state law did not treat DCAs as insurance, then
the fee would be a finance charge.
[D]ebt cancellation fees paid to a creditor are treated as
finance charges because they are charged by the creditor as
an incident to the extension of credit and, although
optional, the fees are not of a type payable in a comparable
cash transaction. 109
In other words, according to the proposal, a charge is
"imposed," within the finance charge definition, whenever it is
incurred by the consumer in connection with the credit transaction,
even if voluntarily. The reference to a "comparable cash transaction"
suggests that the FRB staff saw that as the sole escape hatch for
optional fees-they would be excluded from the finance charge only
107 Truth in Lending, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,764 (Dec. 7, 1995).
108 Id. at 62,764-65.
109 Id. at 62,765 (emphasis added).
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if the same fees would be paid in cash purchases.
At almost the same time, the FRB, responding to a
congressional directive, 110 solicited comments on "how the finance
charge could more accurately reflect the cost of consumer credit."''
In this request, the FRB again made clear its position on optional
charges:
The term "imposed" [in Regulation Z § 226.4(a)] is
interpreted broadly, to include any cost charged by the
creditor (unless otherwise excluded), including charges for
optional services paid by the consumer.'
12
The FRB had drawn its line in the sand. Presumably to
prevent customer charges from leaking out of the finance charge into
fees for "optional" services, the FRB's position was clear enough-
incurred means imposed. What remained to be seen was how the
FRB's principle plays out in real cases.
The initial DCA proposal was withdrawn in 1996,'13 on the
ground that DCAs should be treated in parallel with credit insurance,
regardless whether DCAs were insurance under state law, and that
this required an amendment to Regulation Z itself, not just the
Commentary.1 14 When the regulatory proposal appeared a few
months later,1 15 the proposed treatment of DCAs would be consistent
with that for credit insurance. DCA fees were expressly included in
the list of examples of finance charges," 16 but the fees could be
excluded from the finance charge if the creditor made essentially the
same disclosures as for credit insurance.
117
The FRB finalized this regulatory change for DCAs in
September 1996.118 Although the practical effect of the change was
110 Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, § 2(f),
109 Stat. 271 (1995).
. Truth in Lending, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,179 (Dec. 21, 1995).
2 Id. at 66,180.
113 Truth in Lending, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,952 (Apr. 4, 1996).
114 Id. at 14,953.
115 Truth in Lending, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,126 (May 24, 1996).
116 Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(10), 61 Fed. Reg. at 26,127 (May 24, 1996).
"' Id. at 26,128.
118 Truth in Lending, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,237 (Sept. 19, 1996). A credit insurance
company unsuccessfully challenged this amendment to Regulation Z, on the ground
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that DCA fees would not be treated as finance charges, the FRB took
pains to elaborate further on its baseline "incurred means imposed"
position:
The Board believes that a debt cancellation fee charged by
the creditor satisfies the definition of a finance charge
because it is part of the cost of the credit. The TILA defines
a finance charge to include any charge imposed as an
incident to the extension of credit. The Board has
interpreted this definition to include any fee charged by the
creditor in connection with the loan, if it is not charged in
comparable cash transactions and is not subject to an
express exemption. The Board has generally taken a case-
by-case approach in determining whether particular fees
are 'finance charges," and does not interpret Regulation Z
to automatically exclude all "voluntary" charges from the
finance charge. As a practical matter, most voluntary fees
are excluded from the finance charge under the separate
exclusion for charges that are payable in a comparable cash
transaction, such as fees for optional maintenance
agreements or fees paid to process motor vehicle
registrations. In the case of debt cancellation agreements,
however, the voluntary nature of the arrangement does not
alter the fact that debt cancellation coverage is a feature of
the loan affecting the total price paid for the credit.
119
Interestingly, while this regulatory amendment was pending,
the courts got their first real opportunity to weigh in. In McGee v.
Kerr-Hickman Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,1 0 the federal appellate court
confronted the same issue the FRB was facing administratively-are
debt cancellation fees finance charges or not? In the court's view,
they were not. Rejecting the argument that the only optional fees
excludable from the finance charge are those incurred in a
comparable cash transaction, the court saw the question as "whether
the charge was required to obtain the particular credit terms that were
that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority by extending credit-insurance
status to products that were not in fact credit insurance. Am. Bankers Ins. Group,
Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 3 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 1998). The court found that the
Board had acted within its broad range of regulatory authority under TILA § 105,
15 U.S.C. § 1604.
119 Truth in Lending, 61 Fed. Reg. at 49,239 (emphasis added).
120 McGee v. Kerr-Hickman Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 93 F. 3d 380 (7th Cir.
1996).
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selected." 121 It answered the question by reasoning:
GAP [the form of DCA involved] affects the relationship
between the parties in the event that total loss insurance
coverage is inadequate to meet the borrower's remaining
loan debt, not the credit terms of the actual loan between
the parties. Therefore, the GAP fee was properly included
within the "Amount Financed" disclosure in the sales
contract and excluded from the "Finance Charge"
disclosure. TILA's purpose of assuring consumers an
opportunity for meaningful comparison of different
available credit terms is not undermined unless the argued-
for disclosure actually involves credit terms.'
22
The contrast between the FRB's view and the court's is sharp,
and might have sparked an ongoing debate between the regulators
and the judiciary. But the FRB's amendment to Regulation Z, treating
DCAs like credit insurance, moots the specific point in the case.1
23
So, in round one, the FRB preserved its principle, while de
facto allowing optional DCA fees to be excluded from the finance
charge.
b. Round Two: Expedited Payments and Card Delivery
In the late 1990s, credit card issuers began pressing the FRB
for clarification of the proper treatment of several common types of
charges applicable in card plans. The two examples that surfaced
124
were (1) a fee for arranging an expedited payment on a customer's
account to avoid delinquency or accelerate collection, typically
through an ACH transfer; and (2) a fee for expedited delivery of a
new or replacement credit card as by overnight courier rather than
121 Id. at 384.
122 Id. at 385.
123 The court, anticipating the amendment, acknowledged as much. Id. at 385
n.10. Consumer lawyers applauded the Board for sticking to its policy premise that
optional fees are "imposed" and therefore are finance charges. National Consumer
Law Center, TRUTH IN LENDING 107, 3.6.4 (4th ed. 1999) ("[T]he Board
explicitly and unequivocally rejected McGee's reasoning-the notion that
voluntariness alone determines what is and is not a part of the finance charge ....
This expression of the Board's position, given the deference it commands by
courts, should be persuasive.").
'24 These examples may have been surrogates, or stalking horses, for a wide
range of optional services that card issuers offered or are considering offering.
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regular mail. Each is voluntary in the sense that the customer remains
a customer, on the same contractual terms, whether the customer
elects the expedited service or not. Are such fees finance charges, or
"other charges," or do they fall into the third bucket of "not 'other
charges"'?
The FRB staff had been informally advising that expedited
payment fees were probably finance charges, on the incurred-means-
imposed principle described above, while the expedited card delivery
charge might be a "reissuance fee" which is in the list of "not 'other
charges."" 25 The FRB's Commentary clarification proposed in
December 2002,126 however, acknowledged that "the proper
characterization of these fees under TILA previously has been
unclear."' 27 It then suggested that a fee for expediting a payment did
not seem to be "incidental to the extension of credit if this payment
method is not established as the regular payment method for the
account," 128 and so concluded it was not a finance charge. But the
proposal went on to say that, because "[t]he charge appears to be a
significant charge related to the credit plan,' 2 1 9 it should be treated as
an "other charge. ' 3 A fee for expediting delivery of a card, the FRB
staff proposed to confirm, was neither a finance charge nor an "other
charge."
In the final version of this Commentary amendment, both the
expedited payment and expedited delivery charge were relegated to
the "not 'other charge"' category. The FRB staff effectively conceded
that neither was "incidental" to the credit plan, nor a "significant" fee
125 Commentary 6(b)-2.
126 Truth in Lending, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,618 (Dec. 6, 2002).
127 Id. at 72,618. This lack-of-clarity concession may have been intended to
reduce the litigation or examination exposure of card issuers that were not treating
these charges as "finance" or "other" charges. In this connection a former banker
observed that examiners from the three federal bank agencies (FRB, FDIC, and
OCC) were taking different, inconsistent positions on whether various voluntary
service fees were finance charges. E-mail from Trent Sorbe to Nathaniel Butler,
Esq., August 13, 2002 (copy on file with authors), excerpted in Mr. Butler's
comments to the FRB.
128 Truth in Lending, 67 Fed. Reg. at 72,618.
129 Id. at 72,619.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 39-46. "Other charges" must be
specifically disclosed to customers at several points, and usually an addition of or
change in an "other charge" requires a change-in-terms notice. The Board proposed
to exempt expedited payment fees from change-in-terms notices. Proposed
Commentary 9(c)(2)-1.vi.
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"related" to the plan. But each of these designations was closely
hedged. The Commentary language for expedited payment speaks of
A fee charged for arranging a single payment on the credit
account, upon the consumer's request (regardless of how
frequently the consumer requests the service), if the credit
plan provides that the consumer may make payments on the
account by another reasonable means, such as by standard
mail service, without paying a fee to the creditor.'3
For the exclusion of expedited card delivery fees, the
Commentary describes
A fee to expedite delivery of a credit card, either at account
opening or during the life of the account, provided delivery
of the card is also available by standard mail service (or
other means at least as fast) without paying a fee for
delivery. 132
So, two more specific examples of charges for optional
services were addressed, and in both cases the FRB declined to apply
the principle that fees are finance charges even if for voluntary
products or services. This time the rationale centered on the "incident
to" phrase, more than whether the charges were "imposed."
c. Round 3: What is Next? DCAs Revisited?
In each of these post 1995 rulemakings, the FRB has been
willing to back away from a blind application of its incurred-means-
imposed principle, and applied separately the test that in any case a
finance charge must be "incident to" an extension of credit. But it is
doubtful the FRB means to retreat fully from the principle.
131 Commentary 6(b)-2.x. Further, the Supplementary Information
emphasizes that "[t]he expedited payment service covered by the proposal is not a
payment method established in advance as the expected method for making regular
payments on the account." 68 Fed. Reg. at 16,186 (emphasis added). And the same
explanatory material says that while expedited payment fees may be neither finance
nor other charges, that is only "at this time." Id. Even at this time, one can nit-pick
the new Commentary language to pieces: Suppose a customer has missed two
monthly payments and requests an expedited payment to restore the account to
good standing. If this is not a "single payment," it doesn't qualify as a "not 'other
charge."' But is it now an "other charge," or does it revert all the way back to
"finance charge"?
132 Commentary T 6(b)-2.ix.
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In connection with the 2003 Commentary revisions on
expedited payments and card delivery, the FRB staff noted that
commenters had suggested the FRB adopt a general rule for the
treatment of credit card fees. Said the FRB staff:
There is significant merit in reviewing this area to assess
whether general principles can be articulated for
determining the appropriate treatment of creditors' fees.
Accordingly... the staff plans to recommend that the
Board undertake such an assessment to determine if a
general rule can be established consistent with the
requirements of TILA.1
33
At this writing, there is no evidence of any progress on this
effort. In the meantime, however, the FRB reaffirmed its general
commitment to an "all-in" finance charge principle, or at least to the
view that voluntarily incurred charges are presumptively finance
charges. As part of its new Commentary revision proposals in late
2003, the FRB staff asked for information regarding new forms of
debt cancellation, or debt suspension, agreements.' 3 The FRB staff
mentioned anecdotal information about new forms of debt
cancellation or suspension agreements keyed to life cycle events such
as marriage and divorce. 135 In the request, the FRB staff reminded
that "although debt cancellation fees satisfy the definition of a
'finance charge"' and may be excluded only if properly disclosed,
"[t]he types of debt cancellation agreements eligible for the
exclusion"'1 36 are limited to certain forms of DCAs as specified in
Regulation Z.
[The exclusion of DCAs from the finance charge on proper
disclosure] applies to fees paid for debt cancellation
coverage that provides for cancellation of all or part of the
debtor's liability for amounts exceeding the value of the
collateral securing the obligation, or in the event of the loss
133 Commentary 6(b).
134 68 Fed. Reg. 68,793, 68,795 (Dec. 10, 2003).
135 Caroline E. Meyer, Lenders Peddle Protection at a Hefty Profit, THE
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2004, at E-1 (discussing how these products have drawn the
attention of the popular press).
136 68 Fed. Reg. at 68,796.
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of life, health, or income or in case of accident. 37
Thus, says the FRB staff, DCAs are excluded from the
finance charge only if they cover the same kinds of mishaps as credit
insurance. At least presumptively, then, these new-fangled DCAs are
finance charges unless and until the FRB rationalizes them out of that
category.
The FRB may also have its eye on a potential collision
between excludable credit insurance and DCA fees on one hand, and
the separate and unqualified inclusion in the finance charge of pure,
old-fashioned default insurance on the other.138 If creditors offer
wide-ranging forms of agreements that cover or reschedule the
outstanding debt in a variety of circumstances that otherwise might
trigger default, one can certainly ask whether those products have not
become a form of "guarantee or insurance protecting the creditor
against the consumer's default or other credit risk." 13And for this
type of creditor protection there is no easy escape from a finance
charge characterization. 140 It is, after all, payment for one of the
characteristics of credit arrangements-the allocation of risk.
To this point, the FRB staff has stuck to its theoretical guns
on the proposition that charges incurred are charges imposed, and
therefore finance charges. But they have not made that proposition
stick to any of the examples brought before it. Meanwhile, the FRB
staff's latest and rather casual pronouncement concerning life-cycle
DCAs is an open invitation to consumers and their lawyers to litigate
the proper disclosure of charges for those products. The mere
restatement of the staff's theoretical position may create a prima facie
case of mis-disclosure for creditors that are not treating those charges
137 Regulation Z § 226.4(d)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
138 Id. § 226.4(b)(5) includes in the finance charge, "Premiums or other
charges for any guarantee or insurance protecting the creditor against the
consumer's default or other credit loss." Id.
The Commentary to this subsection identifies "repossession insurance" as a form of
credit loss insurance. Commentary 4(b)(5)-l. If a DCA forgives the loss resulting
when the debtor is divorced and surrenders his financed automobile to the creditor
because he is unable to maintain payments, is that really a DCA or is it "default or
other credit loss" protection? If it is the former, it may be out of the finance charge;
if the latter, it is in.
139 Commentary I 4(b)(5)-1.
140 Unlike credit insurance and DCAs, there is no legal mechanism for
excluding credit loss insurance from the finance charge, even if it is optional and
disclosed as such.
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as finance charges.
V. In Search of a Better Principle for Optional Charges
The questions still begging answers are whether the optional
nature of the associated product or service, in and of itself, controls
the characterization of the charge, and when and whether this product
or service is so related to the credit extension as to be part of its cost.
The question can be put simply: are charges for optional products or
services "imposed" by the creditor, and are they "incident to the
extension of credit," within the meaning of the regulatory definition?
One possible answer is a flat "no," on the premise that the finance
charge is meant to capture only those costs that the consumer must
pay to get the agreed credit at the agreed rate and over the agreed
term. Charges for additional services or products that the consumer
can take or leave are, on this theory, not finance charges. An
alternative answer, consistent with TILA's generally all-inclusive
approach to measuring the cost of credit, is to say that once the
consumer agrees to add an additional product or service to the credit
agreement, the fee becomes an obligation of the consumer and to that
extent is required-"imposed"-as an "incident" of the overall
transaction or plan, unless, of course, it fits one of the explicit
exclusions in Regulation Z. Notice that neither of these approaches
looks at the amount of the fee or where the fee goes; whether the fee
is marked up to generate revenue for the creditor, or is shared with
third-parties who help provide the optional product or service, is
disregarded.
The trouble with the first approach-the flat "no, optional
charges are not finance charges"-is that it may be too sweeping in
coverage, prone to abuse through high pressure or deceptive
marketing, and it tends to dilute the finance charge and understate the
APR whenever a creditor can shift its pricing strategy from
mandatory charges to supposedly optional ones. The opposite all-in
approach-anything the consumer agrees to pay is presumptively a
finance charge-is also problematic, in exactly the opposite direction.
It tends to inflate the finance charge (and APR) with additional fees
that are not really credit-related, thus overstating credit costs and
probably discouraging creditors from offering those auxiliary
products and services. It also requires a series of ad hoc evaluations
and reviews by the FRB when new fees surface, until their treatment
is specifically addressed. Further, it violates the basic congressional
conception of the finance charge as a measurement of the cost of
credit, not the cost of something else.
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The choice of approach becomes even cloudier when one
considers subsidiary questions including:
Should it make a difference whether the extra service is
included in the plan at the outset or is added later?
141
Does it matter whether the extra service (and the fee for it)
is included in the documentation for the "plan," or is a free-
standing agreement?
1 42
Does it make a difference to whom the charge is payable-
the creditor itself, or a third-party service provider? 4 3 If a
third party provider is involved, does it matter whether the
creditor keeps or otherwise shares part of the fee? 144
Does it matter how often the consumer uses the optional
service? 145 Could the service and the fee become de facto
141 In the recent ruling on expedited services, the Board staff itself waffled on
this aspect. Fees for expediting payments are "not 'other charges' only if they are
not part of the original agreement, but a fee for expedited card delivery qualifies as
a "not 'other charge"' even if incurred when first opening the account. Compare
Commentary I 6(b)-2.x with Commentary 6(b)-2.ix.
142 Or suppose the charge for expedited payment service that the creditor
advertises or promotes is institution-wide (not limited to borrowers), and is
available to any customer who wants to transfer funds, whether to pay a credit card
bill, make a deposit, purchase a CD, or whatever. Is the fee still "incident" to the
plan?
14' E.g., the courier company that delivers the expedited card, or the vendor
who arranges the expedited ACH payment. Regulation Z § 226.4(a)(1)(i)
cryptically sweeps some third-party charges into the finance charge if the creditor
"requires the use of a third party as a condition to the extension of credit." Id. But
this does not apply if the fee is "otherwise excluded under this section," which
makes the rule a bit circular with respect to fees for services offered by the creditor
on an optional basis but to be performed by a third party.
144 Third-party charges are also finance charges if the creditor "retains a
portion of the third-party charge, to the extent of the portion retained." Regulation
Z § 226.4(a)(1)(ii). But this too is qualified: "unless [the fee is] otherwise excluded
under this section." There is the same circularity here as noted in the preceding
footnote.
145 The recent rulemaking on expedited payments is curious in this regard. It
explicitly says that to qualify for the "not 'other charge"' category, the service fee
must relate to "a single payment on the credit account" and cannot be "a payment
method established in advance as the expected method for making regular
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part of the plan just by repetition?
These questions, and others that will arise, may be
answerable, but they suggest that any clarifying principle dealing
with optional fees will need to be both nuanced and clear.
VI. Other (Im)possible Approaches to Optional Services
Fees: Finance Charge or Not?
There may be several other theoretical approaches to
identifying whether, and when, charges for optional services are
finance charges. The trouble is, most of them do not work very well
when push comes to shove.
A. The Truly "All-in" Finance Charge
The TILA finance charge definition began as a rather all-
inclusive one, and then has been whittled away by statutory and
regulatory exceptions over time. Why not strengthen the all-in
premise of the finance charge definition by drawing a line that
permits no further exceptions, and perhaps revisits some current ones,
from the literal language "imposed... incident to" an extension of
credit?
payments on the account." Commentary 6(b)-2.x; Supplementary Information, 68
Fed. Reg. at 16,816. Yet the Commentary expressly says that the exclusion
operates "regardless of how frequently the consumer requests the service." So
apparently a consumer could request expedited payment services every single
month, so long as the underlying plan permitted payment by regular mail as a
matter of contract right. (One can imagine the bold graphic on every periodic
statement: "Avoid late charges. For expedited payment, call 1-800-123-4567.") If
this is permitted, why shouldn't the consumer and the creditor be able to agree at
the outset to use the expedited service without a monthly ritual of separate
requests? Suppose the original credit agreement doesn't specify any "expected"
method of payment, but gives the consumer choices: pay by mail, by debit to your
checking account, or by ACH transfer from an account elsewhere. Now how do
you characterize fees related to these choices? The Board's supplementary
information concerning the Commentary on expedited payment says that it
[W]as not intended to address electronic payment options that are not
offered as an alternative to paying a late fee, or bill payment services
offered in connection with a consumer's deposit account that might be
used to pay credit card bills as well as other bills.
68 Fed. Reg. at 16,186.
Apparently, therefore, a fee for an optional electronic payment option is subject to
the general rules on finance charges, and would appear to be "imposed" (i.e.
incurred) as an "incident to" the credit extension.
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The FRB, in fact, moved in this direction in its 1998 Report to
Congress ("FRB-HUD report") with the Department of Housing and
Development ("HUD") on reforming TILA and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") with respect to mortgage
transactions,1 6 recommending several variations of a more or less
"all-in" finance charge definition. The FRB even suggested new
statutory language to help achieve this goal. The essential definition
of finance charge would be "the cost the consumer is required to pay
to get the credit," and this would include numerous consumer outlays
that are now excluded from the finance charge. 147 Whether the
proposed language would foreclose debate about charges for optional
services is doubtful: the phrase "required to pay" seems as potentially
ambiguous as the current "imposed ... incident to" language. The
theory would be that once the consumer elects the optional service
and incurs the fee, that fee becomes an additional cost to the
consumer for the now-modified credit plan.
The FRB-HUD Report primarily addressed closed-end
mortgage loans, so one should not over-read the "all-in" proposal.
But, conceptually, it could be extended to all forms of credit,
including open-end plans, and, if so, there are problems with it at
several levels.148 An all-in approach would tend to inflate the
amounts of finance charge and resulting APR, particularly the
historical APR in open-end periodic statements. 149 While some might
cheer this effect because it would force creditors to compete on the
basis of rate (APR) as well as customer service, this treatment of
optional fees in open-end credit would not really affect the nominal
APR-the prospective, annualized periodic rate-at all. And it is
only that nominal rate that the creditor must disclose in advertising,
solicitations, and account-opening disclosures. °50 The fee-based
exaggeration of the historical APR could at best influence those
146 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System & Department of
Housing and Urban Development, JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING
REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE SETrLEMENT
PROCEDURES ACT, Ch. 2 (July 1998) [hereinafter FRB-HUD Report].
147 Most of the real estate exclusions in present law would be eliminated, and
in one of the suggested variations (the "consumer pay" approach) even optional
charges such as for credit life insurance would be included. Id. This would require
significant statutory amendments to accomplish.
148 See FRB-HUD Report, supra note 146.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
150 Regulation Z §§ 226.5a(b)(1), 226.6(a)(2), 226.16(b)(2).
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current cardholders who saw and understood the historical APR.' 5'
The more serious objection to the all-in approach is that, at
least in many applications, it has no economic integrity. Take the two
most recent examples, expedited payments and expedited card
delivery. The customer's contractual account relationship with the
creditor-the credit line, rate and other contingent costs, and payment
obligation-remains unchanged whether a customer elects the
optional service or not. The customer may avoid a late charge by
requesting an expedited payment, or enjoy uninterrupted access to the
credit by getting courier delivery of a new card. Those extra fees are
not only optional, they are not costs attributable to the establishment
or maintenance of the credit. 152 The fee buys an independent,
palpable benefit to the consumer, distinct from or at most peripheral
to the credit product itself.
B. "Follow the Money"
A superficially attractive way to deal with charges for
optional products or services might be to focus on the creditor's net
yield as the measure of a finance charge. For example, if it costs the
creditor eight dollars to arrange the expedited delivery of a customer
151 See supra text accompanying notes 27-32 (explaining that APR is still
subject to many difficulties).
152 Other hypotheticals suggest gradations of the issue:
(1) A card-issuing bank promotes the availability, for a five dollar fee,
of an end-of-year compilation of credit purchases and cash advances, to
help the customer with record-keeping and tax preparation. That fee
may be literally "incident" to the credit plan, but it is for a discrete data
service that is in no sense a cost of the credit.
(2) A card-issuing bank promotes to cardholders the availability of a
safe-deposit box service for five dollars per month, chargeable to the
card account. That bank service and fee may tenuously be "incident" to
the plan, but the deposit-box service has nothing to do with the credit
and the fee is not a cost of that credit.
(3) A cardholder responds to a "stuffer" advertisement in her periodic
statement and orders a fifty-dollar toaster which is charged to her
account. The toaster solicitation is piggy-backed on the open-end plan
periodic statement, and the purchase will be shown on a subsequent
statement, but it strains credulity to suggest that an all-in principle
should treat the fifty dollar toaster as a finance charge.
(4) A customer must buy a postage stamp to mail in a payment; or must
buy a computer or pay phone charges to make an electronic payment.
Are these "incidental" finance charges?
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payment through an ACH, and the creditor charges the customer
fifteen dollars for that service, the seven dollar mark-up or profit
would be treated as a finance charge. The premise of this approach is
that while eight dollars of the customer's expenditure buys equivalent
value, the remaining seven dollars goes directly into the creditor's
hopper of earnings from the credit plan and is therefore part of the
cost of the credit-a finance charge.
As a general proposition, TILA does not attempt to restrict the
amount of creditor charges, or to differentiate between the cost and
profit portions of those charges. TILA tries to make the credit pricing
transparent, through disclosure, but does not limit rates or other price
components. With respect to optional services, the best example is
credit insurance, where the premium is excluded from the finance
charge if voluntary and properly disclosed, even though the creditor
realizes substantial profit from the sale of the insurance, through
rebates, commissions, or similar arrangements with the insurance
underwriter. The treatment of casualty insurance on property serving
as collateral is comparable. 153 Another example may be non-filing
insurance, which is excluded from the finance charge so long as the
premium does not exceed the actual costs of filing financing
statements to perfect security interests; the regulation ignores any
profit margin the creditor can realize within that cap. 154 And clearly
amounts excluded from the finance charge because they are payable
in comparable cash transactions, such as extended warranties, remain
excluded even though they include substantial price mark-ups. 155
Still, the approach of treating as finance charges only portions
of consumer cost components-"following the money"-is not
unprecedented in TILA finance charge jurisprudence. Since 1968, the
Act and Regulation have permitted real estate creditors to exclude
153 Regulation Z § 226.4(d)(2) (providing that a consumer may opt to obtain
casualty coverage on his own, but if the insurance is obtained from or through the
creditor the creditor must disclose the term and premium).
'54 Courts have clamped down on "padded" non-file insurance. Cf Edwards v.
Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 1998) (confirming findings that the non-
filing insurance was essentially spurious).
155 This can create other disclosure problems, however. There has been
significant litigation on the creditor's disclosure of payments to third parties as part
of the itemization of the amount financed where the creditor has "upcharged" the
third party's price to generate profits for itself. Regulation Z § 226.18(c). The
leading case holds that a creditor is apparently safe from litigation only if it
discloses the actual splits or at least discloses that "we may be retaining a portion of
this [third-party payment] amount." Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc.,
112 F. 3d 283, 285 (7th Cir. 1997).
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from the finance charge a variety of mortgage-loan closing costs.
156
But the regulation adds the qualification that the fees must be "bona
fide and reasonable in amount," presumably to discourage creditors
from packing or inflating these charges. The effect, then, is that a
charge that is not bona fide, or that exceeds a reasonable amount is a
finance charge, at least to the extent of the excess. The same issue
can arise in connection with the finance charge tolerances thatpermit
some understatement without it constituting a TILA violation.
157
"Follow the money" shows up in several other places as well.
These involve third-party charges that would normally not be finance
charges because the creditor does not impose them. But "if the
creditor ... retains a portion of the third-party charge," it is a finance
charge "to the extent of the portion retained.'' 158 Another example
involves taxes and fees for creating or releasing a security interest,
where the exclusion extends only to charges "prescribed by law that
actually are or will be paid to public officials"; 159 the intimation is
that a mark-up of governmental fees is a finance charge.' 
60
These examples of a "follow the money" approach apply most
often to mortgage loans, where there has been long-standing concern
about the packing of closing costs. But the regulatory language could
extend, or be extended, to some optional charges relating to credit
cards or other open-end credit offerings. In the example above where
the creditor charges fifteen dollars for arranging an expedited
payment, pays eight dollars to a third-party "expediter," and pockets
the extra seven dollars for itself, one might argue that the seven
dollars should be a finance charge.' 6 1 This could be applied to any
156 Truth in Lending Act § 106(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (2004); Regulation Z §
226.4(c)(7).
157 Regulation Z §§ 226.18(d), 226.23(g). There has been a recent flurry of
litigation on these issues, including the following question: If the charge is more
than a reasonable amount, does the whole charge become a finance charge, or only
the excess? See, e.g., Guise v. BWM Mortgage LLC, 377 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2004).
See also Craig A. Varga, Turn Back the Clock of Tolerance in TILA Mortgage
Cases?, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES. LAW REP., vol. 7, No. 16, at 3 (Feb. 25, 2004)
(reporting on pending cases challenging fees as outside of tolerances).
158 Regulation Z §§ 226.4(a)(1)(ii), 226.4(a)(2)(iii).
159 Id. § 226.4(e)(1).
160 Compare Abbey v. Columbus Dodge, Inc., 607 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1979)
(finding mark-up was a finance charge), with In re Fryer, 183 B.R. 322, motion for
recon. denied, 183 B.R. 654 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995) (finding mark-up was not a
finance charge).
161 The current language on third-party charges probably does not fit here
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optional services that involve a third-party vendor.
The problem with this approach is partly theoretical and
partly practical. At the theoretical level, it ducks the core question
whether it involves the cost of credit, i.e., whether the optional
service fee is "imposed. . . incident to an extension of credit," the
essential finance charge definition. If the creditor is providing a truly
optional service that is fairly disclosed and only tangential to the
underlying credit plan, why should any part of that charge be
considered a finance charge? This approach would tag certain
creditor revenue streams as finance charges without regard to
whether the charge was really for one of the four cost-of-credit
components: origination, servicing, funding, and risk of loss.
An even bigger problem is the practical one. How, and when,
does one measure the amount of retained revenue-the supposed
profit-that the creditor realizes from these optional services and that
this approach would treat as finance charge? Again, in the example
above, it was assumed that the fifteen dollars expedited payment
charge is split between the creditor, who gets seven dollars, and the
third-party expediter, who gets eight dollars. But is not the creditor
entitled to some compensation for overhead in handling the
arrangement, and if so, how much? Suppose the working
compensation arrangement with the expediter is that the division of
revenues depends on volume, or is otherwise set after the fact on an
experience or commission basis; here there is no way to know at the
time the customer chooses the service how the fifteen dollars will be
divided. 162 Suppose the creditor supplies the service in house, without
using third parties at all? Is it necessary to analyze the creditor's
operating expenses? Suppose the optional service was mis-priced, or
designed as a loss leader, and didn't really generate any profit
revenue? Whatever supposed attractiveness there is in trying to
isolate components of creditor fees as finance charges, it almost
certainly fails in the execution. At best, it would leave the rule
murky, without the kind of bright line reliability that creditors desire
and the public should expect of a disclosure law.
because the creditor does not "retain" a portion of an amount "charged" by the
third-party. Regulation Z § 226.4(a)(1)(ii).
162 Conceivably the creditor could disclose an "estimated" finance charge
amount, but that just compounds the uncertainty and artificiality of trying to follow
the money. Regulation Z §§ 226.5(c), 226.17(c)(2).
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C. Emphasize the "Optional" Nature of the Charges
A third alternative approach would build on the premise that
fees for truly optional products or services cannot be finance charges
so long as there is a baseline credit plan the consumer can use
without those products or services. A rough analogy might be drawn
to the purchase of a new car. The buyer's objective is reliable
transportation, and the buyer can choose the stripped-down version of
a new vehicle to achieve that objective. But, for various reasons, the
buyer may want accessories like a DVD player, a navigation or
security system, or a full-size spare tire. Or the buyer might want
distinct add-ons, like a trailer hitch or an auto club membership, and
these and other add-ons may be available at the time of sale or
afterward. In the buyer's calculus of what to spend, "basic
transportation" has one price, while personal preference adds
additional costs. A credit plan might be viewed in a similar way-a
basic plan and an enhanced plan.
Theoretically, pursuing this approach means accepting the
notion that the finance charge includes only those costs the consumer
is required to pay to obtain the baseline credit plan. Any other
optional add-ons are just that, separate items or features, freely
chosen, for a price reasonably disclosed and therefore comparable to
other creditors' offerings. However rational such an approach might
seem, it is fraught with difficulties.
It is contrary to the expressed view of the FRB staff that even
optional charges are finance charges, and would require the Board's
reassessment and redirection of that view, perhaps by regulatory or
statutory fiat.
It would likely accelerate the pace, and perhaps open the
floodgates, for creditors to shift pricing from basic credit costs, like
the interest rate, points, or APR, to optional add-ons, to the extent
that the finance charge and APR would become less significant, even
unreliable, measures of the realistic cost of credit.
It is overly simplistic in treating all optional products or
services alike. Even though in recent rulemakings the Board as a
practical matter has not actually treated an optional fee as a finance
charge, there are some candidates for such treatment. For example, in
connection with the regulatory revision to deal with DCAs, the Board
itself posed the example of a variable-rate loan where the customer,
for a fee, could add an option to convert to a fixed-rate loan."' The
Board reasoned:
163 61 Fed. Reg. 49,237, 49,239 (Sept. 19, 1996).
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Even though the lender does not require that particular
feature, when it is included for an additional charge (either
paid separately at closing or paid in the form of a higher
interest rate [or points]), that amount properly represents
part of the finance charge for that loan, even though less
costly loans may be available without that feature.' 
64
This seems intuitively correct. The same could be said, for
example, for a charge to permit the consumer to make bi-weekly
payments instead of monthly, or a charge to permit the consumer to
skip payments over the winter holidays or in the summer months. The
point is that these optional features change the basic credit
relationship by altering the contractual repayment pattern under the
loan. And if the press reports on new forms of life-cycle DCAs are
accurate, 165 these, too, may be voluntary options, but ones that alter
the basic performance obligations and risk allocations in the credit
extension.
This "optional means out" approach would also almost
certainly resurrect the debate over reverse competition and high-
pressure or deceptive marketing that permeated discussions of
voluntary credit insurance. Creditors might pay lip service to
whatever ground rules are in place to assure that optional products
and services appear voluntary, but still engage in sharp selling that
achieves substantial penetration rates in terms of percentages of
consumers led to choose the optional feature.'
66
To respond to the marketing concern just described, it would
almost certainly be necessary to build into the TILA structure some
explicit mechanism to try to assure real voluntariness on the part of
consumers. That would likely mean something like the current rules
for credit insurance and DCAs--disclosure that the feature is not
required, its cost if chosen, and a separate signed authorization from
164 Id. at 49,239.
165 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 135, at E-1 (discussing the impact of the rapid
unregulated increase in debt protection programs on consumers).
'66 In fact, it could be worse. Credit insurance products at least are regulated as
insurance, for example as to loss ratios-the percent of premiums paid out in
claims. The various other examples of optional features have no independent
regulatory framework, and to the extent a creditor's offerings are unique to it, there
is no competition at all. See Meyer, supra note 135 (reporting one estimate that loss
ratios on life-cycle DCAs were in the low single digit range, as compared to fifty to
sixty percent for regulated credit life or disability insurance).
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the consumer. 167 This could introduce new complexities as to the
format, timing, and accuracy of those disclosures, and create a
breeding ground for litigation.
D. A Remaining Conundrum: "Other Charges" or Not?
Regardless what approach is taken on optional charges as
finance charges-one of the alternatives above, or the recommended
one proposed below-there will remain the question whether certain
non-finance charges are "other charges" in open-end credit. This has
the consequences of requiring disclosure, and, in most cases,
triggering change-in-terms notices if they are "other charges," but
excluding them altogether from TILA coverage if they are "not 'other
charges.'
The current test for "other charges" is that they are not
finance charges, are "significant," and are "related to" the plan.
68
The question is whether this provides adequate, consistent guidance.
The FRB's recent handling of expedited payment fees shows how
shadowy the test can be. After acknowledging the views of
commenters that an expedited payment charge "is not part of the
credit plan and is not significant in its occurrence or in amount,"
'' 69
the FRB merely stated its conclusion that "[b]ased on the record
established by the comment letters, the fee for expediting a
payment... does not clearly meet the standard for treatment as an
'other charge."",170 This was a grudging concession at best,171 without
shedding much light on the critical criteria of whether the charge was
''significant" or "related to" the plan.
The FRB implicitly recognized that "significant" can refer
both to the amount of the charge and to the frequency of its
application. Recurring charges seem more obviously to call for
disclosure than isolated or infrequent ones. Significance as to amount
will probably remain elusive as a general criterion, except as it can be
assessed for a particular charge. In the expedited payment charge
167 Regulation Z § 226.4(d). At the very least it would seem to require a
specific disclosure of the costs of the feature, as is the present rule for excluding
security interest charges from the finance charge. Id. § 226.4 (e).
168 Regulation Z § 226.6(b)-1.
169 68 Fed. Reg. 16,185, 16,186 (Apr. 3, 2003).
170 id.
171 Whatever the basis for the Board's conclusion, it is only operative "at this
time," apparently reserving the Board's right to change its mind. Id.
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analysis, the FRB noted that the fee was probably less than the
amount of the late charge that it allowed the customer to avoid. 
72
A better opportunity for consistency rests, we believe, on the
"related to" criterion. As the Commentary currently reads, it is a bit
of a non-sequitur. It speaks of "charges related to the plan,' ' 173 when
conceptually the issue really is whether the product or service
purchased for that fee is functionally related to the plan. 174 The
concept of "related to" must also be somehow different from the
notion of "incident to" which drives the finance charge definition.
From this perspective it may be easier to judge whether certain
charges are "other charges" to be disclosed as such. If the charge is
for a service that affects the plan but does not change the creditor's or
the consumer's rights or obligations under the plan, it is an "other
charge." If the charge is for an unrelated or accessory service that
merely results in the posting of the charge to the account, it is not an
"other charge." Thus a fee for credit fraud insurance, or for providing
hard-copy periodic statements, would be "other charges," but a fee
for use of an institution-wide customer hotline, or for safe-deposit
box privileges, would not.
It may also be defensible to say flatly that any fee that is not a
finance charge and is truly optional on the consumer's part is not an
"other charge" either. Whether this works may depend on which
approach to the finance charge definition is in place. If the finance
charge includes optional charges that are considered "imposed...
incident to" the credit transaction, there is more justification for
releasing non-finance charge fees for optional add-on products or
services from any disclosure burden. Even "not 'other charges"' are
presumably based on a contractual agreement between the parties,
and will show up as an entry on the periodic statement.
172 Id.
173 Commentary I 6(b)-l.
174 Conceivably, the consumer could agree to pay for a particular plan-related
service in cash. It makes no sense to ask whether this payment of a charge is
incident to the credit plan. Rather, one needs to know what service the charge is for,
and how that service relates to the plan.
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VII. A Recommendation for a Finance Charge Principle
for Optional Products or Services
A. Implicit Policy Restraints
From the discussion to this point it is possible to state several
baseline policy issues relating to fees for optional products or
services.
1. Non-Interference with Product Design
From the beginning of TILA in 1968, the basic premise of the
Act has been that creditors must accurately disclose their credit
charges and terms, but are free to design and price their credit
offerings as they wish. TILA is neither a usury law, nor a prescriptive
limitation of contract terms. 175 The characterization of charges as
finance charges, "other charges," or "not 'other charges,"' therefore,
should be approached carefully so that the disclosure consequences
do not become de facto limitations on creditor ingenuity and
consumer choice in the marketplace.
2. Integrity of the TILA Disclosure Scheme
The reliability of TILA to produce consumer disclosures that
are truly comparable and consistent depends ultimately on the
integrity of the finance charge definition and its applications. The
TILA approach to the finance charge is generally an all-inclusive
one, though replete with exceptions and carve-outs, 176 that
emphasizes consumer outlays rather than creditor yield. This ought to
require a reasonably meticulous test that sweeps into the finance
175 Of course TILA does some of this. There are a number of special credit
card rules to regulate dispute handling and other processes involving credit card
plans. See, e.g., Regulation Z §§ 226.11, 226.12, 226.13. The TILA rescission rules
permit consumers unilaterally to cancel certain mortgage loans. Id. §§ 226.15,
226.23. Some argue that the restrictive provisions of section 226.32, which
implements the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") of 1994,
have the effect of capping rates and fees at the HOEPA thresholds for creditors who
are reluctant to make subprime loans under the HOEPA restraints. Regulation Z §
226.32.
176 The FRB itself refers to the current definition of finance charge as a "some
fees in, some fees out" structure. See, e.g., FRB-HUD Report, supra note 146, at
VIII.
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charge all sums the consumer pays "as an incident to or condition of'
the extension of credit. To the extent creditors can shift revenue from
"interest" or other obvious finance charge categories into non-finance
charge fees, the finance charge becomes less reliable as a measure of
the cost of credit.
3. Avoiding Disclosure Distortions
It is not good public policy in a law intended to foster "truth
in lending" to use as a measure of the benchmark cost of credit a
formula that distorts the finance charge number and the APR derived
from it. Under-inclusiveness in the finance charge definition results
in understated amounts of finance charge and correspondingly
understated APRs. But over-inclusiveness is also undesirable when
the finance charge sweeps in consumer outlays that really are not
integral to the amount or availability of the credit, and therefore
produces artificially skewed finance charge and APR numbers. The
definition of finance charge ought to rest on an economically sound
assessment of what is the real cost of the credit.
4. Unlikelihood of Statutory Change
The definition of finance charge has been essentially
unchanged since TILA was first enacted in 1968. In the TILA
"simplification" legislation in 1980, Congress and the FRB had an
opportunity to revamp the definition, but they did not. More recently,
in 1995, Congress instructed the FRB and HUD to review the content
and timing of TILA and RESPA disclosures made in conjunction
with mortgage loans. The agencies in fact recommended "that the
definition of the finance charge ... be expanded to include all costs
the consumer is required to pay in order to close the loan, with
limited exceptions." 177 There has been no serious congressional
attention given to this recommendation since it was made in 1998.
Call it inertia, or fear of the unknown, but there is probably little
interest from any 1quarter in a radical reformation of the finance
charge definition.17° That means that any clarification of the
177 FRB-HUD Report, supra note 146, at III.
178 The FRB-HUD Report, supra note 146, may be the most radical proposal
concerning the finance charge in several decades, albeit directed primarily at
mortgage credit. It not only would make the finance charge more all-inclusive than
the present "some fees in, some fees out" approach, but would rewrite the basic
mantra to state that the finance charge comprises "the costs the consumer is
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treatment of fees for optional products or services will have to come
within the constraints of language of the present statute, and
probably, as a practical matter, without substantial change to
Regulation Z.
B. The Current Predicament
In the present state of affairs, the issue of whether, and when,
charges for optional products or services are finance charges is
unsettled. The FRB maintains the policy that even optional charges
are finance charges when they are "imposed"-meaning incurred by
the consumer-as "incident to" the extension of credit, even though
they are not required conditions for that credit. This posture by the
FRB has led to several rulemakings where the FRB has retreated
from applying its policy strictly, suggesting that even the FRB
realizes that its approach is somewhat overbroad and uncertain. In the
meantime, as optional services and fees for them proliferate in the
marketplace, creditors, consumers, and regulators lack guidance on
the proper treatment of those charges. Creditors in particular face
litigation exposure, which is reinforced when the FRB staff
pronounces and re-pronounces its general policy with respect to
products and services that are not yet the subject of formal
rulemakings.179 Not only has the FRB put creditors at risk, but the
process for clarifying whether particular optional charges are or are
not finance charges remains wholly reactive where the FRB staff
takes up one example at a time. There must be a better way.
Coincidentally, the Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig 80 may have provided an
interpretational hint that both confirms the difficulty of the TILA line
drawing and acknowledges the need for it. The issue in the case was
whether an over-limit fee imposed by a card issuer was properly
treated under Regulation Z and the Commentary as an "other charge"
required to pay to get the credit." While the Report says this would "eliminate most
of the difficulties," id. at IX, one can foresee another thirty years of interpretive
uncertainty over this choice of words. Even under its recommendation, the Report
carefully notes, "[f]ees for optional services and costs that depend on consumer
choices.. . would continue to be excluded." Id. at IX n. 18.
79 The Board recently published its view that charges for new forms of life-
cycle debt suspension agreements are at least presumptively finance charges. But
this was in the context of an informal request for information about those products,
and the request itself was tacked on to formal proposals for Commentary revisions
on completely different topics. 68 Fed. Reg. 68793, 68795 (Dec. 10, 2003).
'80 Household Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pfennig, 124 S. Ct. 1741 (2004).
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rather than as a finance charge. The cardholder argued below that
since the fee was triggered by an extension of credit beyond the
established limit, it was literally a cost of new credit and, therefore, a
finance charge and the Court of Appeals agreed.18' The Supreme
Court, however, criticized the court below because it "made no
attempt to clarify the scope of the critical term 'incident to the
extension of credit."' 82 Continuing, the Court said:
Certainly, regardless of how the fee is characterized, there
is some connection between the over-limit fee and an
extension of credit. But, this Court has recognized that the
phrase "incident to or in conjunction with" implies some
necessary connection between the antecedent and its object,
although it "does not place beyond rational debate the
nature or extent of the required connection. . ." [citation
omitted]. In other words, the phrase "incident to" does not
make clear whether a substantial (as opposed to a remote)
connection is required. Thus, unlike the Court of Appeals,
we cannot conclude that the term "finance charge"
unambiguously includes over-limit fees. That term,
standing alone, is ambiguous.83
We believe the issue as to charges for optional products or
services is exactly so. Whether they are finance charges may be
subject to "rational debate," but is ultimately to be determined by
how substantial or remote is the connection between the service
purchased with the fee and the underlying credit arrangement.
C. Proposal
Especially in light of the Pfennig insight, we despair of
drafting a rule on optional service charges that is at once
comprehensive (to cover all imaginable fees), crystal clear (to
provide bright line safe harbors), and consonant with long-standing
TILA disclosure policies (neither under- nor over-disclosure). But we
do believe it is possible to state a general principle that is consistent
with both economic and legal understandings of the cost of credit.
Creditors would then need to make business and legal judgments
about how the principle applied to the particular charge at hand. The
181 Pfennig v. Household Credit Serv., Inc., 295 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2002).
182 Pfennig, 124 S. Ct. at 1748-49.
183 Id.
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existence of the principle as an exercise of FRB interpretational
authority for TLA should provide a measure of protection for
creditors against litigation challenges or bank examiner criticism. Yet
the FRB, and the courts, would remain free to analyze whether, in a
particular instance, the creditor had properly characterized the charge.
The principle might be stated as follows:
Some charges that consumer borrowers pay for optional
products or services are either not imposed by the creditor,
or are not incident to an extension of credit. In general, a
fee incurred by a consumer for an optional product or
service offered by or through the creditor is not a finance
charge if
(a) The fee is designated for a product or service that
is voluntarily purchased by the consumer pursuant to
an agreement that is severable from or additional to an
underlying credit transaction or plan;
(b) The creditor discloses the fee for the product or
service to the consumer in a reasonable manner before
or at the time the consumer agrees to incur the charge;
and
(c) The consumer's purchase, or failure to purchase,
the product or service does not alter the amount of the
credit, the consumer's access to it, the timing or
method of repayment, or the allocation of credit risk,
as provided in the underlying transaction or plan.
Some explanations on this formulation:
The preamble is meant to confirm the general proposition that
while some optional fees may be finance charges, some such fees are
not. This is generally consistent with the current FRB view. It rejects
the notion that merely because a product or service is optional, the
charge for it cannot be a finance charge.
To fit under this exclusionary principle, the product or service
must satisfy all three of the criteria in subsections (a) through (c).
Subsection (a) emphasizes the voluntariness of the purchase,
as a distinct option or add-on to what is otherwise a complete
transaction or plan. Creditors will need to be prepared to demonstrate
and defend the contractual independence of the optional product or
service, but this language does not prescribe any particular method
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for doing so. 184 This criterion could include optional add-ons at the
time the transaction is consummated or the open-end plan is
established, as well as optional after-market add-ons.
Subsection (b) contemplates that the optional product or
service, and the charge for it, must be disclosed before the consumer
commits. It does not specify the language or format of the disclosure,
only that it be in a reasonable manner, which could be oral. Again,
the creditor would have the burden of demonstrating that it made an
appropriate disclosure. Nothing in this proposed principle limits the
amount of the charge or the manner in which the creditor may share it
with third parties.
Subsection (c) zeroes in on the essential cost-of-credit aspect.
Whatever the optional product or service, the consumer's action or
inaction with regard to it must leave the underlying credit relationship
intact. If the optional product or service changes any of the original
credit terms or adjusts the credit risk, the fee is not excluded under
this principle. These essential credit terms include the amount of
credit or credit line, the timing of the availability of funds or the
consumer's means of accessing a credit line, the schedule of
payments (including minimum payments in an open-end plan), and
the medium through which payments are made.
We believe this principle is consistent in fact with the specific
rulings of the FRB since 1995.185 As a general proposition, DCAs
would be kept within the finance charge category under this principle
because they do not satisfy criterion (c): by purchasing the DCA, the
consumer's repayment obligation is modified to permit certain
payments to be excused or deferred.186 Charges for expedited
payments, at least isolated payments, would fit this exclusionary
principle, because the underlying terms of the credit plan remain
unchanged whether the customer uses the expedited payment service
or not. 187
184 One can imagine that creditors might devise an "agreement" mechanism
similar to that used now for credit insurance and DCAs-a separately signed
authorization.
185 It is also consistent with the earlier, pre-1980, staff letters on optional
purchases. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
186 Of course the Board has gone farther and permits creditors to exclude
certain DCA charges from the finance charge on proper disclosure and with explicit
customer authorization, in parallel with the statutory and regulatory provisions on
credit insurance. Nothing in this suggested principle would inhibit the Board from
making similar adjustments for other types of optional charges.
187 While it is true that by declining the expedited payment service the
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Applied to other examples mentioned in this article, the
suggested principle produces, we believe, the right results. None of
the four hypotheticals, supra note 138, would be finance charges
because the purchased item or service has no bearing on the
underlying credit repayment or risk allocation. Most of the examples
in the text following note 16, supra, also would appear not to be
finance charges, since there is no adjustment of credit terms or risk.
The FRB's own example of a fee for the right to convert an
adjustable rate to a fixed rate would seem clearly a finance charge, as
it affects the creditor's yield and risk.188 The charge for new cash-
advance checks might seem to be a finance charge under our
suggested principle (because it affects the consumer's access to the
credit line), but the charge is probably excluded so long as it does not
exceed the cost of replacement checks for a deposit account. 89 The
"subordination fee," supra note 13, is probably a finance charge
because the refinancing creditor requires the subordination.
1 90
As conceded, not all examples would be so easy. More
difficult would be a creditor fee for arranging electronic payments on
an open-end account, either as an add-on arrangement after the plan
has been established, or as an optional arrangement at the plan's
inception. To be excluded from the finance charge under the FRB's
existing 2003 Commentary clarification concerning expedited
payments, the optional "expedited" payment fee must relate to a
single payment and the plan must permit a baseline payment method
that involves no fee. At first blush, under the suggested principle, this
seems unduly narrow. Arranging regular ACH payments from a
consumer's deposit account, in lieu of payments by regular mail, does
not measurably change the credit risk; if the consumer closes the
deposit account, or maintains a balance too low to cover the
prearranged debits, the creditor still faces a delinquency and a
collection risk. Moreover, for the consumer, the electronic debit fee
replaces a postage stamp and the time the consumer uses to write and
mail a paper payment, and no one argues that the cost of the stamp is
a finance charge. On the other hand, if the consumer voluntarily
agrees to electronic payments each month, there is less risk that a
consumer may incur a late charge, which the expedited payment service would
avoid, the imposition of that late charge is not a change in the terms of the plan but
merely an application of one of them.
188 See supra notes 163-64.
189 Regulation Z § 226.4(b)(2); Commentary 4(b)(2)-1.
190 Regulation Z § 226.4(a)(l)(i).
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payment will be overlooked or paid late. Also, electronic payments
are likely to reduce the creditor's servicing costs by eliminating
labor-intensive paper check processing. On balance, we believe that a
creditor fee for ACH or similar handling of payments on a recurring
basis sufficiently reflects a component of credit costs (account
servicing) that it should be considered a finance charge. 191
Many real or theoretical optional charges would fall out of the
finance charge because they simply do not implicate the credit
relationship, and are merely accessories to it. On the other hand, a
charge for an option to convert an adjustable to a fixed-rate
obligation would be a finance charge because the consumer's
repayment obligation and price have been changed. So would a fee
for a skip-payment option, for the same reason. Indeed the generic
class of optional service charges that would most often be treated as
finance charges are debt cancellation or debt suspension
agreements-or whatever the creditor calls them-where, for a fee,
the creditor agrees to reduce or suspend the customer's payment
obligation. In this kind of arrangement, the creditor and consumer are
bargaining for a basic reallocation of credit risk and a modified
revenue stream. A premium charge for that sort of reallocation is, we
submit, part of the essence of the cost of credit.
D. Methodology of Implementation
If a version of this principle is worth implementing, there is a
question of how to do it with the least disruption of the long-standing
191 Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, creditors may not require that
consumers make payments electronically. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 913(1),
15 U.S.C.A. § 1693k(l) (2004). But if a creditor were free to require electronic
payments, it would seem clear that a fee for that arrangement would be a finance
charge-"imposed as an incident to" the credit extension. If a consumer voluntarily
chooses to make electronic payments, and becomes contractually bound to do so,
the fee for that service is no less a cost of the credit package.
A creditor theoretically could offer a credit product such as a credit card as a loss
leader, expecting to make counter-balancing revenue from the sale of optional
products or services that are marketed to cardholders. For example, the card might
carry a below-market APR and no other significant fees, but the issuer might
market travel services, investment products-even toasters, at a substantial profit.
The principle we suggest here simply would not reach this situation. The associated
products or services have only the most remote relationship to credit extension, and
ought not seriously be considered to be finance charges. Something comparable
occurs when the auto manufacturers subsidize the rates charged by their captive
finance companies, allowing the lawful marketing of "zero percent" or other
minuscule APRs.
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statutory and regulatory provisions.
Although most of the discussion in this article has involved
open-end credit, the finance charge definition is universal, applying
to closed-end credit as well as open-end credit.192 There is nothing
about the proposed principle that limits its applicability to one form
of credit or the other. So the "principle" should be stated with equal
applicability to both. That suggests it be related to the basic definition
of finance charge, rather than to the separate disclosure rules for
closed-and open-end credit.
The choice then is between amending the regulatory
definition of finance charge, or adding the principle as a clarifying
part of the Commentary. Since the principle accepts the current
language of Regulation Z, and requires no change in that language, it
would not seem necessary to amend the regulation itself.
The remaining question is whether adoption of the principle
in the Commentary is an appropriate function of the Commentary.
We believe it is. The whole purpose of the Commentary is to provide
"official staff interpretations of Regulation Z."' 9  Good faith
compliance with the Commentary "protects creditors from liability
for any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with"'1 94 such
FRB staff interpretations. The Commentary, in other words, is not
intended to be a source of new, prescriptive or proscriptive rules, but
rather a source of safe-harbor guidance for creditors.' 95 And while
some parts of the Commentary are very specific and precise, there are
numerous instances where the Commentary states fairly broad
principles or general policies.'
96
That is how the suggested principle is cast-not as a new or
revised definition of finance charge, but merely as an authoritative
statement of the circumstances in which charges for optional products
192 The disclosure consequences for closed-end credit are less dramatic than
for open-end credit. See infra Part II.A.
193 Commentary I Introduction- 1.
194 id.
195 This safe-harbor function for the Commentary derives from Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) § 130(f), 15 U.S.C.§ 1640(f) (2004).
196 For example, the definition of "open-end credit" hinges on an assessment
of whether the creditor "reasonably contemplates" repeated transaction.
Commentary I 2(a)(20)-3. Whether credit is for business or commercial purposes is
a judgment for creditors to make in light of suggested factors. Commentary 3(a)-
2. All disclosures for open-end credit must be "clear and conspicuous," for which
the Commentary gives only general guidance. Commentary 5(a)(1)-1.
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or services are not finance charges under the regulation as written.
The principle could therefore be implemented by adding it to the
Commentary on the regulatory definition of "finance charge."'
197
VIII. Conclusion
Under the TILA definition of finance charge, the proper
characterization of fees for various kinds of optional services has
remained obscure for years. Recent rulemakings by the FRB have
provided answers for the specific situations presented, but have left a
regrettable uncertainty as to a principled basis for the rulings. The
marketplace is seeing a significant shift of creditor revenues from
traditional interest to fee-based pricing. Unless TILA is to forsake its
reliance on the finance charge as-the most accurate measure of the
cost of credit, the law needs to confront the question of when optional
charges are really credit costs. We believe it can be done, if not
perfectly, at least better than before, by expressing a principle that
focuses not on the optional fees as such, but on the characteristics of
the products and services consumers buy. If the add-on feature
changes the pre-existing or underlying credit risk allocation or other
essential characteristics of the credit transaction or plan, the charge
for that feature is a cost of credit-a finance charge. Otherwise, it is
not.
197 Regulation Z § 226.4.
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